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INTRODUCTION 
There are many reasons to doubt whether administrative interpretation 
was an important part of lawmaking in the early American republic.  The 
conventional wisdom of contemporary lawyers seems to be that until the 
Chevron case,1 statutory interpretation was primarily the role of courts.  The 
modest attention to agency statutory interpretation prior to Chevron, com-
bined with the avalanche of post-Chevron scholarly commentary, suggests 
that from the founding until 1984 the law followed the pattern of Chief Jus-
tice Marshall’s pronouncement in Marbury v. Madison,2 that saying “what 
  
 * Sterling Professor of Law & Management, Yale University. 
 † Yale University Law School. 
 1. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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the law is” was the province of the federal courts.  Post-Chevron, of course, 
scholars have discovered not only that administrators interpret statutes, but 
have even argued that administrative interpretation has displaced adjudica-
tion in courts as the primary means by which federal common law is devel-
oped.3 
Historians and scholars of American political development have fo-
cused our attention in a similar direction.  Professor Theodore J. Lowi fa-
mously declared that “[t]he first century was one of government dominated 
by Congress and virtually self-executing laws.”4  Equally famously, Stephen 
Skowronek labeled the pre-1877 national government a state of “courts and 
parties.”5  If statues were specific and self-executing, as Lowi claims, ad-
ministrative interpretation could hardly be of much importance.  Self-
executing statutes contain their own behavioral requirements and presuma-
bly, enforcement is through prosecution in the courts.  Similarly, a govern-
ment that is composed primarily of courts and parties is necessarily a gov-
ernment in which administrators play minor roles.  Therefore, the interpreta-
tions of these bit players in the legal system are hardly worthy of sustained 
attention. 
There is no denying that Congress passed detailed statutes in the early 
years of the Republic; indeed, some were almost comically specific.  A 
1791 statute laying taxes on distilled spirits occupies fifteen pages in the 
Statutes at Large and specifies everything from the brand of hydrometer to 
be used in testing proof, to the lettering to be used on casks that have been 
inspected, to the wording of signs to be used to identify revenue offices.6  
Similarly, the statute chartering the Post Office lists at great length the sta-
tions through which the main post roads should pass, and fixes postal rates 
in exceptional detail.7  A 1796 land statute demands that surveyors make 
measurements with chains “containing two perches of sixteen feet and one 
half each, subdivided into twenty-five equal links.”8 
And, as Skowronek argues, the building of the American administra-
tive state really takes off in the post-reconstruction period.  New constitu-
tional understandings emerged in the post-bellum world that were more 
sympathetic both to national power and to the recognition of national ad-
  
 3. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common 
Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013 (1998). 
 4. THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM; IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS 
OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 94 (1969). 
 5. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1887-1920 24 (1982). 
 6. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 199. 
 7. Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 232. 
 8. Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 29, § 2, 1 Stat. 464, 466. 
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ministrative capacities.9  To the extent that one equates an “administrative 
state” with a “bureaucratic state,” the post-bellum world of civil service 
reform and the professionalization of offices is the place to look for bureau-
cracy’s emergency as the dominant form of governmental organization.10 
But nineteenth century congressional government followed by the 
twentieth century emergence of an administrative state is not the whole sto-
ry.11  Indeed, substantial revisionist literature on American political devel-
opment regards the conventional “weak state” hypothesis concerning Amer-
ican government as something of a hallowed myth.12  There was more going 
on in American government in the antebellum period than the famously 
limited or small government rhetoric of men like Thomas Jefferson or And-
rew Jackson would suggest. 
The constitutional politics of the antebellum period tends to obscure 
the relatively continuous growth and organizational development of national 
administrative capacity in the first century of the United States.  Long be-
fore the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887—by 
scholarly convention, the moment when, like Athena, administrative agen-
cies first sprang to life fully formed13—Congress delegated broad authority 
to administrators, equipped them with extrajudicial coercive powers, created 
systems of administrative adjudication, and provided administrators with 
extensive rulemaking authority.14  Indeed, some congressional delegations 
were so broad that one wonders whether a contemporary court would be 
  
 9. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 
1863-1977 (1988); and MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1977). 
 10. See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF CENTRAL 
STATE AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859-1877 (1990); and WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830-1900 (1982). 
 11. In three recent articles one of us traces the development of national administra-
tion and administrative law from the founding to the beginning of Abraham Lincoln’s presi-
dency.  In historical sequence, the articles are, Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Ad-
ministrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter Recovering]; Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Ad-
ministrative Law in the Republic Era, 1801-1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636 (2007) [hereinafter 
Reluctant Nationalists]; and Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”:  Ad-
ministrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Administration and the Democracy]. 
 12. See William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. 
REV. 752 (June 2008) and authorities there cited. 
 13. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 439 (2d 
ed. 1985); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
1189 (1986); Richard J. Stillman II, The Constitutional Bicentennial and the Centennial of 
the American Administrative State, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 4 (1987). 
 14. Detailed treatment of some of these matters is provided in Recovering, supra 
note 11; Reluctant Nationalists, supra note 11; Administration and the Democracy, supra 
note 11. 
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able to find any “intelligible principle” or standards guiding the exercise of 
administrative authority.15  Congress left much space for agencies to write in 
the margins of laws and fill in statutory gaps. 
In short, well before the Civil War, national administration in the 
United States was substantial, and statutes were never self-interpreting.  
Moreover, statutory interpretation was largely an administrative function at 
the national level because administrative action was virtually free from ap-
pellate-style judicial review.16  Direct judicial review was limited almost 
exclusively to mandamus actions.17  This meant, of course, that to the extent 
that a statute gave an administrator any discretion whatsoever, judicial re-
view was foreclosed.  Once the court determined that the officer had inter-
pretive discretion, judicial jurisdiction pursuant to mandamus ceased.  And, 
where administrative adjudication was challenged collaterally in lawsuits 
between private parties, the courts treated administrative determinations as 
the adjudications of coordinate tribunals whose judgments could be reversed 
only for lack of jurisdiction.18 
To be sure, there was de novo judicial review of official actions in tort 
suits against federal officers.  Because those officers had no official immun-
ity, their only defense was that they had correctly interpreted and applied 
the statutes that provided their official authority.  Here, courts and juries 
interpreted the law for themselves.19  But this form of review occurred only 
to the extent that official action, such as the seizure or destruction of proper-
ty, would constitute a common law tort unless statutorily authorized.  In a 
very large class of administrative actions—awarding patents and veteran’s 
pensions, adjudicating land claims, licensing vessels and their operators, 
and so on—no such common law action was available.  Therefore, manda-
mus would not lie and appellate review was not provided.  This was not a 
system in which administrators had Chevron or some other form of defe-
rence.  It was a system in which administrators had absolute and final au-
thority to interpret the law.20 
  
 15. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
 16. On the general structure of judicial review and the 19th century, see Ann Wool-
handler, Judicial Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 197 (1991). 
 17. On the development of the contours of mandamus, particularly in the Taney 
court, see Administration and the Democracy, supra note 11, at 1669-84. 
 18. For a discussion of how this system operated with respect to the large adjudica-
tory system concerning private claims to public lands, see Reluctant Nationalists, supra note 
11, at 1725-27. 
 19. See discussion in Recovering, supra note 11, at 1321-31; and Reluctant Natio-
nalists, supra note 11, at 1674-85. 
 20. Indeed Bruce Wyman’s long-neglected early treatise on American administra-
tive law, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF 
PUBLIC OFFICERS (1903), treats the interpretive authority of administrative officers acting 
within their jurisdiction as a constitutional necessity.  For Wyman, the interpretation and 
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In this Article, we explore two aspects of administrative interpretation 
in the antebellum republic.  We first look at the structures and processes of 
administrative interpretation.  Modern lawyers know where to look for 
agency interpretations.  The Federal Register bristles with agency interpre-
tive material, and formal opinions in agency adjudications are compiled and 
reported in much the same fashion as judicial opinions.  Every agency is 
required by the Federal Register Act to publish a description of its internal 
organization and the processes by which it conducts business.  Outsiders 
seeking an interpretation are generally informed about how to petition for a 
ruling of some sort, what types of interpretive statements an agency issues, 
and where the final authority to make binding pronouncements lies.  Be-
cause most agency interpretations that have legal effects on private parties 
are subject to judicial review, modern lawyers fully expect that disagree-
ment about whether agency-implementing actions reflect a proper under-
standing of authorizing statutes will be resolved in court, under whatever 
deference regime is applicable to the type of agency interpretation in-
volved.21  These disagreements might ultimately flow back to Congress, but 
as a request for legislation amending the agency statute, or in rare cases, a 
request for a joint resolution of disapproval under the so-called “Congres-
sional Review Act.”22 
The structures and processes for agency interpretation were much 
more informal and eclectic in the nineteenth century, and certainly in the 
antebellum period.  The internal processes of departments were opaque, and 
no single source compiled or reported administrative decisions.  There was 
no widely available process for unifying interpretation where administrative 
and judicial approaches diverged.  And, Congress often served as essentially 
an interpreter of last resort.  Moreover, the hierarchical processes that are 
presumed by the Federal Register Act’s requirements for publication were 
only beginning to be developed.  Within departments there was a constant 
struggle between center and periphery for interpretive authority.  The role of 
the Attorney General in unifying administrative interpretation across de-
partmental jurisdictions was quite uncertain, and then, as now, the position 
of the President as “Interpreter-in-Chief” was contested. 
  
application of the law is the “internal law” of administration that is committed to the Execu-
tive Branch.  Wyman not only applauds the limitations on mandamus actions, he argues that 
a statute providing for appellate review of administrative determinations should be declared 
unconstitutional.  BRUCE WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING 
THE RELATIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 14, 75-85 (1903). 
 21. For a description of these deference regimes and their treatment in the Supreme 
Court, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Su-
preme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1083 (2008). 
 22. The Congressional Review Act is a part of Title II of the Contract with Ameri-
can Advancement Act of 1996.  It is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2000). 
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Part I will address these structural and procedural issues.  In Part II, 
we turn to the question of interpretive methodology.  Evidence here is 
sketchy and conclusions must be quite tentative.  Agencies, like courts, tend 
to address questions of methodology directly only when there is interpretive 
disagreement requiring an agency to explain its reasoning process.  This is 
common today in hotly-contested adjudicatory or rulemaking proceedings.  
Indeed, the ever-present prospect of judicial review reinforces and expands 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s textually modest requirements for ex-
planation.  By contrast, in antebellum America, most administrative adjudi-
cation was informal and there was no required rulemaking process.  As has 
been noted, the prospect of judicial review—other than in tort actions—
hardly kept administrators awake at night. 
In this context, interpretive methodology must be discerned mostly 
from the administrative practices of line agencies.  Officials provided inter-
pretations in various documentary forms but only rarely attended to the me-
ta-question of how statutes should be interpreted.  In Part III, the interpre-
tive practices of Attorneys General are considered.  Opinions of the Attor-
neys General tended to be somewhat more self-conscious about method, 
particularly as these officers began to see their opinion-writing function as 
quasi-judicial.  We will look at both sources of methodological evidence, 
but the results thus far are suggestive at best.  The Article then concludes 
with some reflections on lessons learned and mysteries yet unsolved con-
cerning agency interpretation in antebellum America. 
I. THE STRUCTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION 
A. Administrators and Their Interpretive Competitors: Courts and Congress 
Although judicial review was limited in the antebellum republic, even 
mandamus review provided an opportunity for courts to second guess agen-
cy statutory interpretation.  An administrator who believed that a statute 
gave him interpretive authority when, in fact, he had no discretion in the 
matter, could be corrected by writ of mandamus.  That is, of course, the 
import of the famous case of Kendall v. United States.23  But, as Decatur v. 
Paulding24 subsequently demonstrated, courts could find administrative 
interpretive discretion that evaded mandamus review in statutes of startling 
specificity.25  Moreover, as is discussed in more detail below, administrators 
then, as now, were capable of refusing to acquiesce in judicial rulings made 
in mandamus proceedings. 
  
 23. Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123 (1883). 
 24. Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497 (1840). 
 25. For a discussion of the Kendall and Decatur cases, see Reluctant Nationalists, 
supra note 11, at 1671-76. 
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There were, of course, situations in which judicial interpretation and 
administrative interpretation of the same statutory terms were available in 
coordinate tribunals.  But this did not imply that administrators would fol-
low the courts’ interpretive lead.  Numerous property and estate matters 
decided by state and federal courts demanded that state statutes and state 
common law be interpreted and applied to determine whether particular 
parties were married.  That question also loomed large in the Pension Of-
fice, which ruled on thousands of applications for widows’ pensions under 
the veterans’ pension laws.  Similarly, the Patent Office determined paten-
tability.  And, while that determination was not subject to direct judicial 
review, the courts heard infringement actions.  A standard defense in the 
latter proceedings was that the invention was not patentable in the first 
place.  In both of these instances concerning pensions and patents, the de-
terminations of administrators and courts radically diverged.26 
Congress, by contrast, often “reviewed” administrative implementing 
decisions.  Although it is highly uncommon today, in antebellum America 
thousands of administrative adjudications were, at least formally, finally 
determined by Congress.  For example, many of the land commissions es-
tablished to determine private claims to public lands issued their decisions 
as reports to Congress.  Congress then either confirmed or rejected the 
commissions’ determinations by statute.  Where private land claims were 
concerned, congressional review was generally cursory.  Most commission 
decisions were affirmed, particularly where they favored the private clai-
mant.  And, rather than rejecting commissioners’ denials of claims, and 
hence their interpretations of existing law, Congress tended to pass liberaliz-
ing legislation instead.27 
On the other hand, Congress was for many years the sole adjudicator 
of claims against the United States.  The number of claims was enormous 
and occupied a huge proportion of congressional attention.  It was not until 
1855 that Congress could be convinced to establish a Court of Claims.  That 
body, like many of the land commissions, had only recommendatory power.  
But, where claims against the government for money damages were con-
cerned, congressional review was far from a formality.  Because Congress 
could not resist re-determining the cases, the first Court of Claims system 
  
 26. On the patent question, see Kara W. Swanson, The Bureaucracy of Genius:  
Private Rights in the Public Interest in the 19th Century United States Patent System (draft, 
September 15, 2008, on file with the author).  On pensions and the marriage question, see 
Kristin A. Collins, Administering Marriage: Marriage-Based Entitlements, Bureaucracy, 
and the Legal Construction of the Family, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1085 (2009). 
 27. See Reluctant Nationalists, supra note 11, at 1708-17. 
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collapsed and was replaced with an Article I administrative court having 
final adjudicatory authority in 1863.28 
In sum, in antebellum America, interpretation of federal law was es-
sentially an administrative function.  Indeed, Bruce Wyman’s turn of the 
century treatise on administrative law states this proposition as a truism.29  
But, who was the “administration”? 
B. The Struggle Between the Center and the Periphery    
We are accustomed to think of all officers of the United States, indeed 
all federal employees, as full-time, salaried personnel who operate within 
well-defined administrative structures.  We also tend to presume the availa-
bility of almost instantaneous communication from the highest level poli-
cymaker to the street-level bureaucrat.  Those were hardly the conditions of 
antebellum America.  Officers in the capital were almost uniformly salaried 
personnel and many, if not most of them, were expected to devote their full 
time to government employment.  Officers in the field, by contrast, were 
often paid by fees for particular services or commissions on collections.  
They had alternative employment; indeed, they were selected because their 
wealth or position gave them status in the local community.  These field 
officers took an oath to uphold the constitution and the laws of the United 
States, but their quasi-independent status seems to have suggested to many 
of them that the interpretation of the Constitution and laws was their own 
personal responsibility. 
For example, Alexander Hamilton encountered difficulties with local 
collectors almost immediately upon the start of federal customs collections.  
He initially insisted on uniformity of interpretation and that his interpreta-
tion should govern.  But, Hamilton was fighting a losing battle.  Collectors 
had to gain the cooperation of local merchants in paying duties, agreeing to 
valuations, and providing necessary bonds.  Lack of accommodation to lo-
cal conditions produced resistance rather than compliance.  Hamilton fired 
off numerous circulars and letters insisting on local conformity to central 
interpretation.  He also sought legislation from Congress, both to reinforce 
his interpretation of the law and to provide an intermediate level of supervi-
sory Treasury officials who could better police the local customs collectors.  
In the end, his efforts at centralized interpretation failed.  Indeed, he issued 
  
 28. On the slow progress from legislative to judicial settlement of claims against the 
United States, see Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States:  
The Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625 
(1985). 
 29. WYMAN, supra note 20, at 255. 
Spring] Administrative Statutory Interpretation 15 
 
a circular that, in essence, advised local collectors to interpret “ambiguous 
language” in accordance with local custom.30 
The territorial growth and rapid expansion of the public civilian work 
force during the antebellum period compounded the difficulties of intra-
departmental communication and supervision.  As Leonard White remarked 
of the early Post Office, “the laxness and indifference of deputies . . . [was] 
progressively more marked as the miles stretched away from Philadel-
phia.”31  The solution lay in the development of an internal law of adminis-
tration,32 by which higher-level administrative officials instructed and moni-
tored subordinates.  But, as Alexander Hamilton learned, that internal law 
was not always respected. 
Implementation of the Jeffersonian trade embargo of 1807–1809 pro-
vides some insight into how statutory interpretations were formulated and 
communicated from high-level administrative officers to their subordinates 
in the early Republic.  The embargo was in some sense an act of despera-
tion.  Latent Franco–British hostilities resumed during Jefferson’s second 
term as president, threatening both American commercial interests and so-
vereignty.  The British and French navies seized hundreds of American 
merchant ships, and the British impressed thousands of American seamen.  
Justifiably leery of outright war, Jefferson persuaded Congress to respond 
by wholesale regulation of foreign commerce—a complete cessation of all 
foreign trade.  This ambitious regulatory scheme was, in Jefferson’s words, 
intended “to keep our seamen and property from capture, and to starve the 
offending nations.”33  However, to prohibit commerce with any foreign na-
tion was also to imperil the livelihood of many citizens of the United States.  
Stiff and sustained domestic resistance was inevitable, as were the scores of 
ensuing questions of law and statutory interpretation. 
Although the embargo was short lived, its statutory history is exten-
sive.  Congress was required to legislate again and again to close the legal 
loopholes through which resourceful merchants evaded the embargo.34  Im-
plementing these evolving statutory commands was even more complex, 
  
 30. For a discussion of Hamilton’s efforts see Gautham Rao, The Creation of the 
American State: Custom Houses, Law, and Commerce in the Age of Revolution 100-121 
(Dec. 2008) (unpublished dissertation, Department of History, University of Chicago) (on 
file with the author). 
 31. LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 
187 (1948). 
 32. The concept of an internal law of administration as part of administrative law 
was developed in one of the earliest treatises on American administrative law.  See WYMAN, 
supra note 20, at 1-23. 
 33. Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury 
(Apr. 8, 1808), reprinted in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 27, 27 (Andrew A. Lips-
comb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905). 
 34. See Reluctant Nationalists, supra note 11, at 1647-96. 
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requiring thousands of individual decisions by customs collectors, naval 
officers, and U.S. Attorneys scattered across the country.  To attempt to 
ensure administrative consistency, Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin em-
ployed the system of Treasury circulars and instruction letters pioneered by 
his predecessor, Alexander Hamilton, in the first years of national revenue 
collection.35 
As previously noted, in dozens of circulars and instructions, Hamilton 
had strenuously resisted the view that the collectors’ oath to uphold the laws 
of the United States bound them to uphold their own construction of the 
laws, rather than that of the Secretary.  Hamilton understood the Secretary’s 
power “to superintend the collection of the revenue”36 to mean that he could 
resolve for his subordinates “the construction of the laws relating to the 
revenue, in all cases of doubt” lest “incongruous practices . . . obtain in dif-
ferent districts in the United States.”37  Although he recognized that forcing 
uniformity in the implementation of the embargo would be an uphill battle, 
Gallatin continued Hamilton’s correspondence system in an effort to control 
and guide lower-level exercises of discretion. 
Upon the enactment of each successive embargo statute, Gallatin sent 
instructions to the field, highlighting particularly relevant provisions of the 
statute; providing a standardized set of interpretations, directives, and in-
structions; and authorizing the exercise of local discretion when necessary.38  
Some of these letters transmitted instructions from the President, but many 
were issued simply on the delegated authority of the Secretary.39  All told, 
  
 35. A small sampling of Hamilton’s Treasury circulars is included in 3 THE WORKS 
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 537-70 (John C. Hamilton ed., New York, J.F. Trow 1850) [herei-
nafter 3 HAMILTON].  Other examples appear in 5 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 49 
(Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904); 6 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 339-40 (Henry 
Cabot Lodge ed., 1904); and LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER, THE CUSTOMS SERVICE: ITS 
HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND ORGANIZATION 8 (1924). 
 36. An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, 65-66 
(1789). 
 37. 3 HAMILTON, supra note 35, at 557-59. 
 38. See generally Albert Gallatin, Circular of Dec. 31, 1807 (on file with author) 
(creating interim rules after the ambiguity of the initial 1807 Embargo Act); Albert Gallatin, 
Circular of Mar. 21, 1808 (on file with author) (creating rules for and transmitting specific 
instructions with respect to section 7 of the second supplementary act); Albert Gallatin, Cir-
cular of Apr. 28, 1808 (on file with author) (providing detailed instructions and detention 
procedures for the supplementary act of April 25, 1808); Albert Gallatin, Circular of Jan. 16, 
1809 (on file with author) (providing formal instructions for the Enforcement Act). 
 39. Compare, e.g., Albert Gallatin, Circular of Dec. 31, 1807 (on file with author) 
(“You are instructed by the President . . . .”); Albert Gallatin, Circular of Mar. 12 1808 (on 
file with author) (“The President of the United States will immediately take into considera-
tion the seventh section of the act in order that some general rules may be adopted for its 
execution.”); Albert Gallatin, Circular of May 6, 1808 (on file with author) (“[T]he President 
considered ‘unusual shipments,’ particularly of flour & other provisions, of lumber and of 
Naval Stores, as sufficient cause for detention of the vessel.”); and Albert Gallatin, Circular 
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during the first eleven months of the fifteen-month embargo, Gallatin issued 
584 circulars or letters of instruction to enforcement personnel concerning 
its implementation.40 
As he had expected, Gallatin’s efforts to promote consistency were 
hardly uniformly successful.  Support for the embargo varied significantly 
across states.  Resistance was common and field officers had to take local 
conditions into account.  Their very lives sometimes depended upon taking 
a “flexible” approach to instructions from central authorities. 
Thus, a pattern continued throughout much of the antebellum period.  
Central office personnel expended enormous effort to unify the interpreta-
tion and implementation of the law.  These efforts were met with local resis-
tance and created considerable slack in the relationship between implement-
ing officials and high level administrators.  Indeed, after 1829, central con-
trol may have been threatened as much by party politics as by local resis-
tance.  When Andrew Jackson’s policy of democratizing the public service 
degenerated into the so-called “spoils system” that continued through much 
of the remainder of the nineteenth century, it generated a workforce of par-
ty, rather than institutional, loyalists.  Because local party bosses often con-
trolled the appointment of local federal officials, central control of peripher-
al implementation arguably became even more difficult.  This situation ul-
timately led to reforms that moved administration in the direction of bu-
reaucratic systems for the control of subordinates, even before the Civil 
War.41  Still it is telling that as late as 1842 Congress felt compelled to pro-
vide explicit authority for the Secretary of the Treasury to issue binding 
interpretations of the revenue laws.42 
  
of Jan. 14, 1809 (on file with author) (“The President gives the following instructions . . . .”); 
with Albert Gallatin, Circular of Apr. 28, 1808 (on file with author) (“I now proceed to give 
some additional instructions . . . .”); Albert Gallatin, Circular of May 18, 1808 (on file with 
author) (using similar language); and Albert Gallatin, Circular of Nov. 15, 1808 (on file with 
author) (“It appears to me . . . .”).  Indeed, Jefferson instructed Gallatin several times that he 
was in the best position to make decisions and should proceed without consultation.  See, 
e.g., Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury (May 
6, 1808), reprinted in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 53. 
 40. NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR., THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT UNDER JEFFERSON 
119 (1978).  Gallatin’s circulars and instructions are collected in a manuscript volume in the 
National Archives entitled, “Circulars, Office, Secretary of the Treasury,” Sept. 14, 1789, to 
Feb. 21, 1828, “T.” 
 41. See discussion in Administration and the Democracy, supra note 11, at 1617-28. 
 42. The statute provided: 
And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of all collectors and other offic-
ers of the customs to execute and carry into effect all instructions of the Secretary 
of the Treasury relative to the execution of the revenue laws; and in case any diffi-
culty shall arise as to the true construction or meaning of any part of such revenue 
laws, the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury shall be conclusive and binding 
upon all such collectors and other officers of the customs. 
Act of Aug. 30, 1842, ch. 270, § 24, 5 Stat. 548, 566 (1846). 
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One should not, of course, overstate the resistance of field level offic-
ers to authoritative advice from the capital.  In the face of local resistance 
and criticism, field officers often sought secretarial interpretations.  As early 
as 1790 one finds a missive from Jeremiah Olney, Customs Collector at 
Providence, Rhode Island, seeking the opinion of the Secretary of the Trea-
sury “[t]hat [he] may not be further censured as having made a demand not 
warranted by law.”43  Secretaries, particularly the Secretary of the Treasury, 
were inundated with requests for interpretations to resolve local disputes.  
Some sense of the numbers of requests emerges from Malcolm Rohr-
bough’s study of the multi-decade federal effort to survey and sell the ex-
panding public domain.44  The general instructions, or “circulars,” sent from 
the general land office to field offices in the period 1789–1837 comprise 
four large folders in the National Archives.  Correspondence between the 
national and field offices during this period occupy another 156 volumes—
excluding correspondence concerning private land claims, which was inces-
sant.  The correspondence between the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Commissioner of the General Land Office (which was located in the Trea-
sury) occupies an additional fifteen volumes. 
The prospect of personal liability for error in an era in which officials 
had no official immunity also propelled subordinate officers to seek and to 
follow central office advice.  To be sure, the authoritative interpretation of 
the Secretary of the Treasury could not prevent a local jury from finding 
that a customs officer had failed in his official duty and was liable in dam-
ages.45  However, officers who were held personally liable often petitioned 
Congress for reimbursement.  An officer’s case for compensation was im-
measurably strengthened if he had followed specific advice from a superior 
officer.  Hence, authoritative interpretation from central offices often satis-
fied both the central office desire for consistent application of the law and 
the field officer’s desire to be protected against local censure and personal 
loss. 
Authoritative interpretation might also come from the Attorney Gen-
eral.  Modern lawyers have come to expect a regularized process for the 
issuance of the Attorney General’s opinions.  They also anticipate that 
many, if not most, of these opinions will be published and accessible.  Of-
ficers of the federal government thus have access to a significant body of 
interpretive precedent that may be treated as authoritative even if the inter-
  
 43. WHITE, supra note 31, at 307. 
 44. See generally MALCOLM M. ROHRBOUGH, THE LAND OFFICE BUSINESS: THE 
SETTLEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC LANDS, 1789-1837 (1968). 
 45. There were a few limited exceptions in which Congress specifically provided 
that a reasonable construction of the statute would protect the officer from personal liability.  
And here, of course, a letter providing an authoritative interpretation from a senior official 
should go some considerable distance toward demonstrating reasonableness. 
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pretation was issued in response to a request from a different department.  
The authoritativeness of the modern Attorney General’s opinions is given 
practical support by the Justice Department’s near monopoly over litigation 
to which the United States is a party. 
Antebellum Attorneys General occupied a very different office.  Early 
Attorneys General were part-timers who were expected to gain their prima-
ry income from their private practice.  Their primary responsibilities were to 
represent the United States in the Supreme Court and to provide opinions as 
requested to the President and the heads of departments.  There was no De-
partment of Justice until 1870, and despite repeated requests from Presi-
dents, beginning with Washington, the Attorney General had no supervisory 
authority over U.S. Attorneys, who were lodged first in the State Depart-
ment and then in the Department of the Interior.  As legal business grew, 
Congress not only failed to provide the Attorney General with a department 
and a substantial staff, it authorized legal counsel for individual departments 
and bureaus, who had their own litigating authority.46 
The first Attorney General whose opinions were treated as authorita-
tive guidance to the interpretation of federal law was probably Attorney 
General William Wirt, who was also the first Attorney General to maintain 
copies of his opinions, although these opinions were not generally available 
to administrative officers.  In addition, legal advice was provided by de-
partmental secretaries, and later by departmental solicitors.  Interpretation of 
the law within the executive branch was neither unified nor unitary.  In cas-
es of conflict, the Attorney General’s views may have been privileged.  In 
1837, for example, the Auditor of the Treasury indicated that he would fol-
low the Attorney General’s advice on questions of law over that of the Sec-
retary of the Treasury.47  But this may have been the exception rather than 
the rule.  The Auditor of the Treasury had independent statutory authority to 
review and settle accounts free from the direction of the Secretary of the 
Treasury.  Moreover, Attorneys General were often deferential to adminis-
trative practice.  When dealing with departmental matters, several Attorneys 
General suggested that their views would be guided by settled departmental 
customs rather than by their independent construction of the statute. 
Attorney General Wirt, for instance, based an opinion concerning the 
removal of customs inspectors almost exclusively on past practice within 
the Treasury Department.  Wirt noted that the relevant statutory language 
was ambiguous and expressed his view as to its “true construction.”48  Still, 
  
 46. On the development of the Department of Justice, see LLOYD MILTON SHORT, 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
184-95 (1923), and see generally, HOMER COMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: 
CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE IN THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE (1937). 
 47. S. DOC. NO. 15-265, at 8-9 (1837). 
 48. Tenure of Office of Inspectors of Customs, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 459 (1821). 
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he made the outcome hinge on “how this clause has been practically ex-
pounded at the Treasury.”49  Subsequent Attorneys General followed suit, 
urging agencies to treat their settled practices as precedents that should be 
reconsidered only in the most exigent circumstances.  In 1829, Attorney 
General John M. Berrien counseled that, “where a question has been delibe-
rately settled by the proper department, under the eye of the government, 
during successive sessions of Congress, it should not be disturbed unless a 
very strong and pressing case shall be made for consideration.”50  And writ-
ing to the Secretary of War in 1852, Attorney General John J. Crittenden 
instructed: 
Adherence to established rules prevents the arbitrary action of the executive 
branches of the government, and produces certainty and equality, at least, in their 
administrations.  I would never advise a departure from them except where they 
appeared to me to be clearly wrong and in plain opposition to the public law, or its 
fair execution.51 
This adherence to precedent promoted the value of consistency, prized by 
the agencies themselves, and reinforced the development of a departmental-
ly-based internal law of administration.  Centralized control of the adminis-
trative interpretation of federal statutes in a chief law officer reporting only 
to the President seems not to have been a prominent feature of antebellum 
interpretive practice. 
Whatever the authoritative position of the Attorney General, presi-
dents from the very beginning seem to have viewed themselves as interpre-
ters-in-chief of both federal statutes and the federal Constitution.  This did 
not mean, of course, that presidents viewed themselves as having the au-
thority to implement their own interpretations when statutory authority was 
conferred elsewhere.  In the famous confrontation between Andrew Jackson 
and Congress customarily known as “The Bank War,” Jackson never took 
the position that he could exercise the authority given the Secretary of the 
Treasury to remove federal funds from the Second Bank of the United 
States.  His claim was only that he had the authority to remove and replace 
Secretaries of the Treasury until he found one whose interpretation of the 
relevant statutory authority matched his own.52 
But many early statutes did give implementing authority directly to the 
President, rather than to some subordinate officer.  For example, the statutes 
establishing the Embargo of 1807-1809 made the President the chief im-
plementer of federal regulatory policy, not merely the overseer of its im-
plementation.  To be sure, Jefferson was required by practical necessities to 
  
 49. Id. 
 50. Pay and Emoluments of Paymaster, 2 Op. Att’y Gen 220, 220 (1829). 
 51. Usages of the Departments, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 562-63 (1852). 
 52. See Administration and the Democracy, supra note 11, at 1585-98. 
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delegate much of his authority to the Secretary of the Treasury.53  Most of 
the heavy lifting, in terms of answering queries and giving instructions to 
enforcement personnel, was left to Secretary Albert Gallatin.  But, Galla-
tin’s letters and circulars seemed to make little distinction between his au-
thority and the President’s.54  The Secretary may have been in day-to-day 
control, but he often explicitly viewed himself as speaking for the President 
when interpreting the embargo statutes and directing the actions of lower-
level personnel.   More importantly for present purposes, implementation of 
the embargo gave rise to the earliest known claim that administrative inter-
pretation should not be controlled by judicial decision when the executive 
officer, here the President, believed the court to be in error. 
Under one of the early embargo enforcement acts, Collectors of Cus-
toms were instructed that they should detain vessels if in their opinion the 
vessel intended to violate the embargo.  In his instructions to Collectors 
concerning the exercise of that authority, Gallatin informed them that the 
President considered vessels loaded with provisions to be suspicious and 
subject to detention.  On the basis of this instruction, the Collector at Char-
leston refused to clear a vessel loaded with rice and ostensibly bound for 
Baltimore.  However, the Collector stated publicly that he did not find the 
vessel suspicious in his own personal opinion, but was nevertheless bound 
by presidential instructions to detain it.  The owner, armed with this public 
  
 53. See Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the 
Treasury (Apr. 19, 1808), reprinted in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 
29-30 (delegating authority to Gallatin to develop enforcement rules); Letter from President 
Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury (Aug. 11, 1808), reprinted in 12 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 121-22 [hereinafter Letter of Aug. 11, 
1808] (same). 
 54. Compare, e.g., Albert Gallatin, Circular of Dec. 31, 1807 (on file with author) 
(“You are instructed by the President . . . .”); Albert Gallatin, Circular of Mar. 12, 1808 (on 
file with author) (“The President of the United States will immediately take into considera-
tion the seventh section of the act, in order that some general rules may be adopted for its 
execution.”); Albert Gallatin, Circular of May 6, 1808 (on file with author) (“[T]he President 
considered ‘unusual shipments,’ particularly of flour & other provisions, of lumber and of 
Naval Stores, as sufficient cause for detention of the vessel.”); and Albert Gallatin, Circular 
of Jan. 14, 1809 (on file with author) (“The President gives the following instructions . . . .”); 
with Albert Gallatin, Circular of Apr. 28, 1808 (on file with author) (“I now proceed to give 
some additional instructions . . . .”); Albert Gallatin, Circular of May 18, 1808 (on file with 
author) (using similar language); and Albert Gallatin, Circular of Nov. 15, 1808 (on file with 
author) (“It appears to me . . . .”).  Indeed, Jefferson instructed Gallatin several times that he 
was in the best position to make decisions and should proceed without consultation.  See, 
e.g., Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury (May 
6, 1808), reprinted in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 52-53; Letter 
from President Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury (May 27, 1808), 
reprinted in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 66; Letter of Aug. 11, 
1808, supra note 53, at 122. 
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admission, brought a mandamus action in the circuit court to require the 
Collector to grant clearance to his vessel. 
The circuit court, per Justice Johnson, a Jeffersonian appointee, 
granted the mandamus.55  Johnson interpreted the statute to require the Col-
lector to exercise his own judgment and noted that nothing in the statute 
gave the president the authority to direct the Collector in forming his opi-
nion.  (Explicit authority was later provided in the Enforcement Act of 
1809.)  Johnson’s decision seemed to presume that the president had no 
inherent authority to direct lower level officials in the exercise of their statu-
tory discretion—at least when, as here, the statute’s text suggested that the 
lower level officer would form his own opinion based on the facts and cir-
cumstances of a particular case. 
Jefferson did not take this judicial rebuff lying down.  He quickly se-
cured an opinion from his Attorney General, Caesar A. Rodney, which re-
jected Justice Johnson’s understanding of the law and his authority to issue 
a mandamus to the Collector.  He then distributed Rodney’s opinion to the 
press and to the Collectors of Revenue, and instructed the latter to ignore 
Justice Johnson’s opinion and to follow Rodney’s.  The press reported that 
the collectors were following the President’s instructions.  Executive inter-
pretation had triumphed. 
But what exactly was Jefferson asserting in countermanding the circuit 
court’s opinion?  Was he, in effect, saying that the President had an inherent 
authority to direct, and hence to interpret, that the Congress could not be 
susceptible to judicial oversight? 
Not really.  Rodney’s opinion56 was largely devoted to the question of 
whether the circuit court could exercise mandamus jurisdiction.  As Rodney 
carefully explained, mandamus had never been an inherent power of the 
courts either in English or American practice.  The Judiciary Act of 1789 
had conferred mandamus jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, but Marbury v. 
Madison57 had declared that part of the statute unconstitutional.  There was 
no statutory conferral of mandamus jurisdiction in the 1789 statute, or oth-
erwise, on circuit courts.  Justice Johnson, in one written defense of his opi-
nion, came very close to conceding this point.58  Moreover, Rodney’s opi-
nion argues that the Enforcement Act itself negatives any implication that a 
court can control the inspector’s judgment by mandamus.  Under the statute, 
all detention orders were to be reported to the president for his approval or 
  
 55. Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston, 10 F. Cas. 355 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 
5420). 
 56. Letter from C.A. Rodney to President Thomas Jefferson (July 15, 1808), re-
printed in 1 AM. L.J. 429, 433-39 (1808). 
 57. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 58. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE UNITED STATES HISTORY 
1789-1835, 335 (1928). 
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reversal.  In Rodney’s opinion, judicial review by way of mandamus direct-
ly interfered with the President’s statutory authority to review detention 
orders.  If the court required that a vessel be released, the president’s statu-
tory review would never occur.  Hence, Congress must have presumed that 
mandamus would not lie in such a case. 
Jefferson also later explained his rejection of Justice Johnson’s posi-
tion—an action we would now characterize as “non-acquiescence”—in a 
letter to Governor Pinckney.59  That letter emphasized standard rule of law 
values, not presidential prerogative.  Congress was right, in Jefferson’s 
view, to provide administrative discretion with respect to enforcement.  But 
if that enforcement were left entirely to individual collectors, the law might 
not be enforced consistently; indeed it might be enforced corruptly.  Unified 
  
 59. Jefferson wrote: 
The Legislature having found, after repeated trials, that no general rules could 
be formed which fraud and avarice would not elude, concluded to leave, in those 
who were to execute the power, a discretionary power paramount to all their gener-
al rules.  This discretion was of necessity lodged with the collector in the first in-
stance, but referred, finally, to the President, lest there should be as many measures 
of law or discretion for our citizens as there were collectors of districts.  In order 
that the first decisions by the collectors might also be as uniform as possible, and 
that the inconveniences of temporary detention might be imposed by general and 
equal rules throughout the States, we thought it advisable to draw some outlines for 
the government of the discretion of the collectors, and to bring them all to one tal-
ly. 
 
With this view they were advised to consider all shipments of flour prima fa-
cie, as suspicious. . . . 
 
But your collector seems to have decided for himself that, instead of a general 
rule applicable equally to all, the personal character of the shipper was a better cri-
terion, and his own individual opinion too, of that character. 
 
You will see at once to what this would have led in the hands of a[] hundred 
collectors . . . and what grounds would have been given for the malevolent charges 
of favoritism with which the federal papers have reproached even the trust we re-
posed in the first and highest magistrates of particular States. . . .  The declaration 
of Mr. Theus, that he did not consider the case as suspicious, founded on his indi-
vidual opinion of the shipper, broke down that barrier which we had endeavored to 
erect against favoritism, and furnished the grounds for the subsequent proceedings.  
The attorney for the United States seems to have considered the acquiescence of 
the collector as dispensing with any particular attentions to the case, and the judge 
to have taken it as a case agreed between plaintiff and defendant, and brought to 
him only formally to be placed on his records.  But this question has too many im-
portant bearings on the constitutional organization of our government, to let it go 
off so carelessly.  I send you the Attorney General’s opinion on it, formed on great 
consideration and consultation.  It is communicated to the collectors and marshals 
for their future government. 
Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Governor Charles Pinckney-Richardson (July 18, 
1808), reprinted in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 102-04. 
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control by hierarchical superiors was therefore essential for consistent and 
equal treatment of citizens under the law. 
To be sure, President Jefferson and his Attorney General might be said 
to have ignored the Supreme Court’s well-known decision in Little v. Bar-
reme.60  That opinion clearly established that executive direction could not, 
by misconstruction of a statute, immunize official action that would other-
wise be unlawful.  Moreover, Little v. Barreme involved an exercise of the 
Commander-in-Chief power—an inherently directive authority.  However, 
the legal error in that case was crystal clear.  The President had ordered sei-
zure of a vessel of the wrong nationality headed in the wrong direction. 
By contrast, the instructions that Jefferson, or Gallatin, had provided 
under the Embargo Act simply narrowed the discretion of customs officials 
by telling them on what basis to form an opinion about whether a vessel 
intended to violate the embargo.  There is surely a much stronger argument 
that the president had inherent authority to provide that sort of interpretive 
direction.  Indeed, in this case inherent authority arguably was not neces-
sary.  The original Embargo Act had given the president authority to direct 
the actions of enforcement personnel, and, in any event, the statutory provi-
sion for a referral of detentions to the president seemed to confer final au-
thority on the president. 
II. ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION IN THE LINE AGENCIES 
As previously noted, the methodological evidence is sketchy and our 
research is incomplete.  This Part relies on some prominent examples in-
volving major federal regulatory efforts or high-visibility interpretive con-
flicts.  The picture that emerges may not be representative, but it is not too 
surprising.  Interpretations by line administrators routinely feature a signifi-
cant concern for administrative efficacy, a value that often can be promoted 
by taking a broad, purposivist approach to statutory meaning.  This is not to 
say that there is little or no evidence of administrative respect for congres-
sional prerogatives or for textual limitations.  Literalism and textualism also 
are in evidence, but those interpretive approaches are sometimes harnessed 
to the pursuit of broader administrative or political purposes.  Indeed, as the 
first example illustrates, purposivism can constrain administrative discretion 
while textualism can free an administrator to pursue political objectives of 
his own—or of his administration. 
One of the most sustained and notorious struggles over statutory inter-
pretation occurred in the previously mentioned “Bank War.”  Newly ree-
lected in 1832, and convinced of popular support for his domestic agenda, 
President Andrew Jackson sought to divest the Second Bank of the United 
  
 60. 6 U.S. (2 CRANCH) 170 (1804). 
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States of its power by withdrawing from it all federal funds and transferring 
them to state banks.  However, the statute establishing the Bank committed 
all federal funds to the Bank and permitted their removal only by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, who was required to state his reasons for withdrawal to 
Congress.61  Jackson’s Secretary of the Treasury, Louis McLane, openly 
supported the Bank and could not be convinced to withdraw the funds.  
Jackson “kicked him upstairs” to be Secretary of State.  McLane was re-
placed by William Duane, a known opponent of the Bank.  Two days after 
taking office, however, Duane equivocated about the wisdom and legality of 
withdrawing the government’s funds and suggested a congressional inquiry 
into the matter.  Jackson, knowing that a congressional majority supported 
the Bank, demurred. 
Duane proved recalcitrant.  His understanding of the banking statutes 
convinced him that the only legitimate reason he could offer Congress for 
removing the government’s funds was that they were unsafe with the Bank.  
But he believed them safe.  After months of negotiation between the Presi-
dent and the reluctant Secretary, Jackson replaced Duane with Roger Taney.  
Taney removed the funds. 
Despite his principled, political opposition to the Bank, Duane relied 
on a purposive reading of the underlying statute.  Congress’ principal reason 
for chartering the Bank had been to ensure safe and faithful custody of the 
government’s funds.  Duane, of course, recognized the executive authority 
of the President, but felt himself circumscribed by Congress’s purposes.  In 
marked contrast, Taney—who conceded that the government’s money was 
currently secure with the Bank—adopted a purely textualist reading.  The 
plain text of the statute placed no restriction on the Secretary’s authority to 
withdraw funds.  It merely required that he report his reasons to Congress.62  
Congress retaliated by censuring Jackson and refusing to confirm Taney, 
either as Secretary of the Treasury (he was a recess appointment) or when 
he was first nominated to the Supreme Court.  But, lacking a veto proof 
majority, Congress was unable to override the temporary Secretary’s literal-
ist interpretation. 
Additional examples of politically expedient statutory interpretation 
are not difficult to locate.  Postmaster General Amos Kendall faced a se-
rious problem, one that implicated the maintenance of peace, good order, 
and perhaps the Union itself.  Abolitionists in the Northeast had sent tens of 
thousands of anti-slavery pamphlets into the South through the postal sys-
tem.  Fearing slave insurrection, local citizens in Charlestown, New Orleans 
and Norfolk broke into post office buildings and burned the pamphlets.  
Hearing these reports, the postmaster in New York refused to transmit any 
  
 61. Act of Apr. 16, 1816, ch. 73, § 16, 3 Stat. 266. 
 62. See CONG. DEB. APPENDIX, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1833). 
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further abolitionist literature until he received instructions from Washing-
ton.63 
Kendall, relying on a literal reading of the postal statutes, cautioned 
that postmasters had no legal authority to exclude any materials from the 
mails due to their contents.  But, foreshadowing President Lincoln’s war-
time justification for suspending the writ of habeas corpus, Kendall then 
moved to higher interpretive ground.  He advised the postmasters, “[w]e 
owe an obligation to the laws, but a higher one to the communities in which 
we live, and if the former be perverted to destroy the latter, it is patriotism 
to disregard them.”64  The spirit of the laws as a whole was, in Kendall’s 
opinion, a trump card that could supersede the plain meaning of any particu-
lar law. 
More commonly, administrators sought through lesser interpretive 
moves to give statutes meaning that remained facially loyal to their congres-
sional mandates, while allowing them to pursue departmental objectives or 
heed presidential direction.  Sometimes, this took fancy footwork, as when 
Congress appropriated funds in 1799 to build six gunships, and the Navy 
Department decided that the statute implicitly authorized the purchase of 
permanent shipbuilding yards.65  As this episode suggests, a pragmatic re-
sponse to administrative challenges can often be mounted by a retreat to 
general statutory purpose where unforeseen circumstances lie in the way of 
effective action. 
Purposivism may lead administrators to construe statutes to limit their 
own discretion as well.  The original Embargo Act prohibited any vessel 
from sailing for a foreign port unless “under the immediate direction of the 
President of the United States.”66  Merchants understood this provision, 
which stated no criteria for the president’s exercise of discretion, as allow-
ing the president to dispense exemptions at will.  Applications poured in 
from every quarter.  The virtual impossibility of sorting legitimate requests 
from evasion schemes drove Jefferson and Gallatin toward a highly restric-
  
 63. See W. SHERMAN SAVAGE, THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
ABOLITION LITERATURE, 1830-60 (1938). 
 64. Amos Kendall, The Incendiaries, NILES’ WKLY. REG., Aug. 22, 1835, at 448.  As 
late as 1857, the Attorney General took the position that a principle of maintaining the public 
peace could override the rule that the mail must be delivered.  Responding to a complaint 
concerning the failure of the Deputy Postmaster at Yazoo City, Mississippi, to deliver a copy 
of a Cincinnati newspaper, Caleb Cushing wrote: 
On the whole, then, it seems clear to me that a deputy post-master, or other officer 
of the United States, is not required by law to become, knowingly, the enforced 
agent or instrument of the enemies of the public peace, to disseminate, in their be-
half, within the limits of any one of the States of the Union, printed matter, the de-
sign and tendency of which are to promote insurrections in such State.  
8 Op. Att’y Gen. 489, 501 (1857). 
 65. WHITE, supra note 31, at 160. 
 66. Embargo Act, Ch. 5, § 1, 2 Stat. 451, 452 (1807). 
Spring] Administrative Statutory Interpretation 27 
 
tive reading of the statute.  Because an unrestrained power to exempt ves-
sels from the embargo would have defeated its purposes, Jefferson and Gal-
latin decided that Congress must have meant to permit exceptions only 
when a voyage by a private vessel was necessary to carry on public busi-
ness.  Gallatin duly published a notice to this effect in various newspapers.67 
Purposivism, described as “intentionalism,” also seemed to be the 
standard approach of the Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steamboats, 
the principal implementing authority under the federal government’s first 
major health and safety legislation.68  The human carnage that resulted from 
steamboat collisions, fires, and bursting boilers in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury fueled popular demand for governmental action and propelled a reluc-
tant Congress into launching a bold regulatory program.  The statute created 
a relatively specific set of safety requirements, but Congress also gave the 
Board of Supervising Inspectors authority to adopt “rules and regulations 
for their own conduct and that [of local inspectors].”69  Although this au-
thority might have been narrowly construed to cover only procedural re-
quirements—the content of required reports and the like—the Board 
adopted scores of substantive rules that often went well beyond the specific 
demands of the Act.  Feeling a need to justify its burgeoning regulatory 
rulebook, the Board explained in its annual report that its guiding principle 
was to inquire into and carry out the provisions of a given statute “according 
to the true intent and meaning thereof.”70 
Purposivism also figured prominently in sub-delegations.  For in-
stance, although the initial Embargo Act gave the President authority to 
issue “such instructions to the officers of the revenue, and of the navy and 
revenue cutters of the United States, as shall appear best adapted for carry-
ing the same into full effect,”71 much was sub-delegated, first to Secretary 
Gallatin and, through him, to the collectors.72  Statutory allocations of deci-
sional authority were not read literally where the action by the named offic-
er was impracticable.  Indeed, the power to sub-delegate was generally pre-
  
 67. See BURTON SPIVAK, JEFFERSON’S ENGLISH CRISIS: COMMERCE, EMBARGO, AND 
THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION 160 (1979). 
 68. See generally Administration and the Democracy, supra note 11, at 1628-65. 
 69. Act of Aug. 30, 1852, ch. 106, § 18, 10 Stat. 61, 70. 
 70. BUREAU MARINE INSP. & NAVIG., 3 STEAMBOAT INSP. SERV., PROC. BD. 
SUPERVISING INSP. STEAM VESSELS 1852-1899, at 34 (Oct. 14, 1858) (Washington, Gideon & 
Co. 1859). 
 71. Embargo Act, Ch. 5, § 1, 2 Stat. 451, 452 (1807). 
 72. See Letter of Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Jeremiah Olney, Collec-
tor of Providence (July 23, 1808) (on file with author) (providing that the commanding offic-
ers of the gunboats were to be governed by general rules established by the several collec-
tors). 
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sumed73 long before the passage of a general “sub-delegation act” authoriz-
ing the president to disperse his formal statutory authority to others.  Rea-
soning that Congress could not have expected the beleaguered President to 
personally oversee the various and sundry details of the growing administra-
tive state, agencies accepted sub-delegations as within general congressional 
purposes and construed statutes accordingly. 
Conflation of legislative purposes and administrative visions of good 
policy is explicable in part by the role of administrators—then as well as 
now—in legislative drafting.  For example, early Congresses relied so heav-
ily on Alexander Hamilton to propose revenue legislation that the House 
disbanded its Ways and Means Committee upon his appointment as Trea-
sury Secretary. Jeffersonian Republican Congresses were more protective of 
their legislative prerogatives, but as national actions multiplied and matters 
became more technical, leaning on administrative draftsmen increased. 
For example, Senator Jefferson Davis told his colleagues in 1850, “the 
Senate is, in my opinion, unable wisely to legislate upon the minute details 
of patents and the Patent Office.  I think it would not detract from the Se-
nate, but be acting the part of prudence, to go to those who have special 
information before legislating upon such subjects.”74  The original Embargo 
Act and its numerous amendments were requested and mostly drafted by the 
Jefferson administration.75  The statute reorganizing the General Land Of-
fice was drafted by Commissioner Ethan A. Brown,76 and the bill reorganiz-
ing the Navy Department was written by Navy Secretary Upshur.77  The 
Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steamboats presented Congress with a 
revision of its legislative mandate that was longer and more comprehensive 
than its original legislative charter, commented at congressional request on 
proposed legislation, and lobbied against amendments that it thought im-
prudent.78  Intimate involvement in the development of legislation certainly 
made it less presumptuous for administrators to claim a sure grasp of the 
underlying purposes of statutes when gaps needed filling by administrative 
interpretation. 
Antebellum administrative interpretation should not, however, be de-
scribed as relentlessly purposive or driven exclusively by bureaucrats’ im-
peratives.  Thomas Jefferson was a zealous implementer of his embargo 
policy, but his Secretary of the Treasury retained a lively sense of both ex-
  
 73. Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839), for example, treats it as axi-
omatic that powers delegated to the President can be exercised by his subordinates without 
even a showing that the President had subdelegated the authority to act. 
 74. JEFFERSON DAVIS, 2 LETTERS, PAPERS AND SPEECHES 5 (Dec. 19, 1850) (Dunbar 
Rowland ed. 1923). 
 75. SPIVAK, supra note 67, at 156-75. 
 76. S. DOC. NO. 24-216, at 1-2 (1836). 
 77. H.R. DOC. NO. 27-167, at 1 (1842). 
 78. See discussion in Administration and the Democracy, supra note 11, at 1651-53. 
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isting legislative constraints and congressional prerogatives.  When re-
quested by the President to take some particularly aggressive enforcement 
action, Gallatin responded: “We cannot destroy the boats, &c., at St. Mary’s 
without being authorized by law so to do; and Congress shows so much 
reluctance in granting powers much less arbitrary, that there is no expecta-
tion of their giving this.”79  And, notwithstanding its broad construction of 
its rulemaking authority, the Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steamboats 
often sought more explicit legislative authorization for its initiatives.80 
When pushing the limits of their authority, administrators also sought 
post hoc validation from Congress.  Jefferson obtained explicit authority to 
direct the discretion of customs officers after his directions were challenged 
by Judge Johnson’s mandamus order.  The Treasury obtained explicit statu-
tory authority to purchase army provisions in 1792—an activity in which 
Hamilton had already been engaged for some time.81  And, during the em-
bargo, Gallatin sent a circular to customs collectors, instructing that “[f]orce 
may be used to detain vessels” before subsequent enforcement acts provided 
clear power to detain.82  In each of those cases, administrators may have 
believed quite reasonably that their actions were within the broad contem-
plation of earlier legislation (in Hamilton’s case, the organic Treasury sta-
tute, and in Jefferson and Gallatin’s cases, previous embargo laws).  But in 
an age of relatively detailed statutes, personal liability for unauthorized ac-
tions that damaged private interests, and the sometimes acrimonious inter-
branch struggles over constitutional powers, safety lay in the pursuit of ex-
plicit statutory language. 
As this brief survey suggests, the multifaceted nature of line agency 
statutory interpretation defies stereotyping.  One generalization, however, 
might be hazarded: administrators were chiefly concerned with promoting 
administrative efficacy.  Again, Albert Gallatin’s actions during the embar-
go provide a useful example.  Faced with a complicated statutory regime, 
worsening economic conditions, and widespread resistance, Gallatin sought 
to balance the enforcement of the embargo laws with the need to alleviate 
financial hardships wherever possible.  In part, he was concerned that the 
unpopularity of the embargo would cost James Madison the upcoming pres-
  
 79. ALBERT GALLATIN, 1 WRITINGS 447 (Dec. 28, 1808) (Henry Adams ed. 1879). 
 80. The Board, for example, requested from Congress a law requiring all vessels to 
be equipped with lights, “as it is known that the absence of such a law has caused loss of life 
and the destruction of property by collisions which might have been avoided had lights been 
carried on the vessels, &c., referred to.”  BUREAU MARINE INSP. & NAVIG., 1 STEAMBOAT 
INSP. SERV., PROC. BD. SUPERVISING INSP. STEAM VESSELS 1852-1899, at 70 (Nov. 5, 1853) 
(Baltimore, James Lucas). 
 81. WHITE, supra note 31, at 121. 
 82. Albert Gallatin, Circular of Dec. 31, 1807 (on file with author).  The power to 
detain was subsequently conferred on collectors.  An Act of Apr. 25, 1808, ch. 66, 2 Stat. 
499 § 11. 
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idential election,83 but he also expressed more humanistic concerns.  For 
instance, despite misgivings about ships sailing under false pretenses, Galla-
tin permitted ships bearing provisions to reach the famine-struck island of 
Nantucket during the winter of 1808.84  And, “consistent with the spirit of 
the provision,” he also authorized the restoration of seized property to cer-
tain good-faith violators of the non-importation act.85  Perhaps most surpri-
singly, given the general underenforcement of the embargo, on one occasion 
Gallatin even chastised his subordinates for overzealous application of the 
law: 
I rather apprehend that the evasions which took place in your district when the em-
bargo was first laid has led you to adopt a more rigid construction than is neces-
sary. I refer you to my circular of 20th . . . and will add that you are by the law itself 
vested with a discretion, which wisely exercised, will be competent to prevent eva-
sions of the law without increasing restrictions beyond what is necessary for that 
object.86 
As faithfully as he upheld the embargo, then, Gallatin also strove to avoid 
fomenting rebellion or creating unnecessary hardship.  Indeed, Gallatin ap-
pears to have been keenly aware of the competing interests at stake.  
Throughout the duration of the embargo, he pursued statutory interpreta-
tions that permitted him to engage in a careful balancing of considerations. 
At times, Gallatin played the textualist.  Regarding section one of the 
Second Supplementary Act, he noted that “the provision which permits ves-
sels uniformly employed within bays, rivers, and sounds, to give a perma-
nent general bond, has in some Districts received a more extensive con-
struction than is warranted by the letter of the law.  This should be strictly 
adhered to.”87  He closed other statutory loopholes by leaning heavily on the 
text.  In a circular noteworthy both for adopting a strict constructionist read-
ing and for accepting repeal by implication, Gallatin instructed collectors 
concerning section four of the Enforcement Act: 
From the generality of expressions used in this section, I am also of the opinion 
that the exception made in favor of boats not masted nor decked, by the second 
section of the Act of 12th March last is also repealed; and that such boats should by 
  
 83. Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Hannah Gallatin (July 8, 
1808) (“As to my Presidential fears, they arise from the pressure of the embargo and divi-
sions of the Republicans.”), quoted in L.B. KUPPENHEIMER, ALBERT GALLATIN’S VISION OF 
DEMOCRATIC STABILITY: AN INTERPRETIVE PROFILE 71 (1996). 
 84. See Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to John Steele, Collector 
of Phila. (Dec. 1, 1808).  See also Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to 
James McCulloch, Collector of Balt. (Dec. 20, 1808). 
 85. Albert Gallatin, Circular of Mar. 2, 1808 (on file with author). 
 86. Letter of Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Enoch Sawyer, Collector of 
Camden, N.C. (June 4, 1808) (on file with author). 
 87. Albert Gallatin, Circular of Apr. 7, 1808 (on file with author). 
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a strict construction, either give the general bond of three hundred dollars a ton, or 
obtain a permit for every trip.88 
Yet Gallatin also relied on textualist readings to ease the burdens of private 
citizens, when doing so did not threaten to undermine the embargo.  For 
instance, Gallatin wrote, “I can perceive nothing in the supplementary act of 
the 12th of March which prohibits the departure of passengers in vessels . . . 
allowed to sail in ballast.”89 
Purpose and practicality were his dominant concerns.  Gallatin was 
adamant that “inconveniences should be obviated so far as it can be done 
without endangering the system,”90 but no farther.  Thus, despite statutory 
language requiring inspectors to be present during the landing of cargo, 
Gallatin wrote: “It may not be necessary in many instances, that the Inspec-
tors should actually be present when the cargo is landed: they may in such 
cases as you will direct, take as evidence of the fact, a certificate from any 
respectable citizen.”91  In Gallatin’s view, easing this particular requirement 
did not undercut the purpose behind the regulatory scheme.  However, he 
was unwilling to risk leniency where it might signal temerity or arouse 
claims of discriminatory treatment or abuse of authority.  For instance, he 
refused to forgive slight violations of the embargo, unless expressly autho-
rized to do so, explaining, “I do not perceive how we can avoid prosecuting 
in cases of infractions of the non-importation act, although the amount be 
but small.  Nor do I think myself authorized to remit forfeitures, when there 
can be no doubt of their having been incurred, except in the manner pointed 
out by law.”92  On another occasion, although no such provision was explicit 
in the embargo laws, Gallatin decreed that “[n]o sales subsequent to the date 
of the Act must be considered as changing the character of an American 
vessel so as to entitle her under the name of Foreign Vessel to the exception 
provided by the proviso of the first section of the Act.”93 
For Gallatin, both purposivism and textualism were in the service of 
creating and sustaining an effective regulatory program.  Gallatin’s guiding 
norm was not interpretative consistency, but rather administrative efficacy. 
He prized not uniformity in the methods for construction of laws, but inter-
pretations that promoted effective implementation.  For line administrators 
efficacy was, and is, the coin of the realm.  Circumstances rarely present 
  
 88. Albert Gallatin, Circular of Jan. 1, 1809 (on file with author). 
 89. Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to John Shee, Collector of 
Phila. (Mar. 31, 1808) (on file with author). 
 90. Albert Gallatin, Circular of May 20, 1808 (on file with author). 
 91. Albert Gallatin, Circular of Apr. 28, 1808 (on file with author). 
 92. Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to John Steele, Collector of 
Phila. (Oct. 27, 1808) (on file with author). 
 93. Letter from Albert Gallatin, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Gabriel Christie, Collector 
of Balt. (Dec. 30, 1807) (on file with author). 
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them with an opportunity for detached or extended statutory analysis.  Ad-
ministration often requires immediate decisions, and the success of crucial 
regulatory programs depended then, as now, on interpreting statutes in ways 
that make them efficacious. 
Once again, we do not want to overstate the degree to which this in-
terpretive strategy produced consistency or wholly effective implementation 
of the law.  Like Hamilton before him, Gallatin found himself unable to 
control the interpretive discretion of local revenue officers, who had the 
major responsibility for enforcing the embargo.  And, like Hamilton, he too 
asked Congress to provide a mid-level corps of supervisors who would as-
sist him in overseeing the actions of customs collectors.  Once again, Con-
gress failed to respond.  As a consequence, local interpretive variance was 
as characteristic of embargo enforcement as it was of revenue collection.94  
For local collectors, the methodology of statutory interpretation seemed to 
focus less on the text and purpose of the statute than on the understanding of 
the local community of the weight of federal regulation that it was willing to 
bear.95 
III.  INTERPRETIVE PRACTICES OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
Freed from the necessities of day-to-day implementation, United 
States Attorneys General could take a more detached and reflective view of 
statutory interpretation when asked for their legal opinions by either the 
President or heads of departments.  As a consequence, their interpretations 
reveal a broader toolkit of interpretive techniques and much greater atten-
tion to questions of interpretive methodology.  Indeed, they were every bit 
as eclectic in their interpretive approaches and use of sources as were their 
judicial counterparts.96 
In the very first recorded97 Attorney General opinion, Edmund Ran-
dolph wrote, “my office is to ascertain the sense of Congress.”98  But subse-
  
 94. For an extended discussion, see Rao, supra note 30, at 280-400. 
 95. In preparing this article, we have reviewed every official opinion of the twenty-
four United States Attorneys General who served between 1789 and 1860, beginning with 
Edmund Randolph and ending with Jeremiah Black. 
 96. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All about Words: Early Understandings of the 
“Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1082-87 
(2001) (describing the variety of interpretive approaches and canons embraced by early 
American judges). 
 97. The earliest records are exceedingly sparse.  When William Wirt took office in 
1817, he was appalled to discover that his predecessors had not preserved any records of 
their opinions, and there were no files indicating prior practice.  Indeed, there was no office.  
The Attorney General was expected to supply his own quarters.  And, while he continued to 
practice privately with great success while Attorney General, Wirt managed to persuade a 
stingy Congress to give him an office and a clerk, and he set about systematizing both the 
activities and the records of the nation’s law officer.  Wirt should probably be credited with 
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quent Attorneys General hardly attended to their office in uniform fashion.  
Indeed, they vacillated fairly dramatically in their approach to statutory in-
terpretation, both from one office-holder to another and even from one opi-
nion to the next.  Nevertheless, some preliminary conclusions suggest them-
selves, permitting some insight into how early Attorneys General inter-
preted congressional statutes and offering a glimpse into their worldviews.  
Although attention is paid to the necessities of administrative efficacy, the 
opinions surveyed also reflect a broader vision that includes concerns for 
the overall coherence of the American legal system and the integrity of the 
constitutional order. 
A. Purposivism, Intent and Spirit vs. Text, Letter and Plain Meaning  
At the outset, it is worth noting that most questions of law facing early 
Attorneys General were ones of first impression.  They often acted without 
the guidance or encumbrance of prior judicial rulings.  The frequency with 
which Attorneys General cited judicial decisions is correspondingly low, 
relative to current practice.  But Attorneys General certainly knew and res-
pected their lawful place within the constitutional structure.  As Jeremiah 
Black wrote, “[w]hat has been decided by that tribunal [the Supreme Court] 
is not, and ought not to be, open to further dispute.”99  Black’s colleagues 
agreed.  Indeed, on occasion, Attorneys General answered questions simply 
by quoting Supreme Court opinions.100 
The tension between what we might broadly term “textualism” and 
“purposivism” seems to have been the chief methodological issue of that 
day, as it is of ours.  Caleb Cushing articulated the problem as “the very 
nice question, whether he, whose duty it is to construe or to execute the law, 
may substitute for what is written the recorded proof of what was intended, 
or in the light of such proof decide that what is written is not law.”101  
Among early Attorneys General the answer to that question varied dramati-
cally, as did its particular phrasing and context. 
They, like their successors, often viewed “congressional intent” as the 
lodestar of statutory analyses.102  But what was really meant by that com-
  
establishing the opinion-giving function of the Attorney General as a quasi-judicial enter-
prise. 
 98. Interest for Certificates for 1791, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 17, 18 (1791). 
 99. Revolutionary Pensions of Children and Grandchildren, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 83 
(1857). 
 100. Security on Removal of Deposites, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 584 (1833). 
 101. Effect of Error in Legislation, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 166, 173 (1855). 
 102. See, e.g., Cadets at West Point, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 276, 279 (1819); Payment of 
Interest to Virginia, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 722, 724 (1825); Extension of the Lake Erie and Wa-
bash Canal, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 358, 360 (1838); What Banks Capable of Being Public Deposi-
tories, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 411, 412 (1839); Coastwise Trade Under Act Prohibiting Slave-
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mitment fluctuated from office holder to office holder.  Some expressed a 
clear preference for the spirit over the letter of the law.  Benjamin Butler, 
for instance, felt comfortable writing that congressional intent “is always 
entitled to primary regard in the interpretation of statutes.”103  He was hardly 
alone in that opinion.  In an opinion discussing new trials for court martial 
defendants, William Wirt overrode statutory language prohibiting a second 
trial.  Wirt reasoned that the statutory provision was designed to benefit 
soldiers and therefore was not applicable when the soldier himself requested 
the trial.  Moreover, Wirt specifically warned that reaching any other con-
clusion would inappropriately focus “on the letter [rather] than on the spi-
rit” of the statute.104  Similarly, having been asked whether an indigent who 
had become affluent may be struck from the pension list, Roger Taney re-
lied on the obvious intent of the relevant pension law in responding affirma-
tively, despite the absence of any express statutory authority.105  
John Crittenden quoted with approval the rule, “[w]henever [the inten-
tion of the lawmakers] can be discovered, it ought to be followed with rea-
son and discretion in the construction of a statute, although such construc-
tion seem[s] contrary to the letter of the statute.”106  Caleb Cushing cited a 
similar rule approvingly: “[e]very statute ought to be expounded, not ac-
cording to the letter, but according to the meaning.”107  In a separate opinion 
about compensating military officers for the loss of horses, Cushing also 
suggested that sometimes, even the “distinct, positive, and apparently une-
quivocal terms” of a statute could be disregarded in favor of an “overruling 
argument of public policy” (although he concluded that such a disregard 
was unwarranted in the instance at hand).108  And, of course, Attorneys Gen-
eral usually were willing to look beyond the text of a law when it contained 
a clear error in transcription.109 
Sometimes, abiding by the literal terms of an act—no matter how 
plain or unambiguous—threatened an absurd result.  Edmund Randolph 
  
Trade, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 512, 514 (1840); Fees of District Attorneys, Clerks, Marshals, &c., 3 
Op. Att’y Gen. 627, 628 (1841); Compensation of Superintendents of Light-Houses, 4 Op. 
Att’y Gen. 249, 250 (1843); Pensions Granted to Widows, &c., by the Act of March 3, 1845, 
4 Op. Att’y Gen. 360, 361 (1845). 
 103. Extra Compensation to Officers of the Army, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 701, 703 (1835). 
See also Liability of Midshipmen to Arrest, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 119, (1836) (basing a refusal to 
exempt midshipmen from arrest on congressional intent, despite the obvious import of the 
statutory text). 
 104. New Trials Before Courts-Martial, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 233, 239 (1818). 
 105. Pension to the Indigent, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 502 (1832). 
 106. Compensation of Commander of Exploring Expedition, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 591, 
600 (1852). 
 107. Principal Clerks of the General Land Office, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 42, 45 (1853); see 
also Case of Sailing Maser John Rush, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 372, 377 (1854). 
 108. Military Officers’ Lost Horses, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 299 (1857). 
 109. Construction of an Appropriation Act, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 419, 419-20 (1839). 
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cautioned, “a consequence extravagantly absurd[] ought to lead us to be 
confident that Congress never contemplated it.”110  Caleb Cushing appears 
to have agreed: “If the words of a statute, when taken in a strict grammatical 
sense . . . would involve an absurdity or an inconvenience, or render the 
enactment nonsensical, in such case, the grammatical sense must be mod-
ified so far as to avoid the absurd, inconvenient, or nonsensical conse-
quence.”111 
When Caleb Cushing included “inconvenience”112 along with “absur-
dity” and “nonsense” as grounds for bending text to circumstance, he was 
not alone.  Several Attorneys General proved quite reluctant to construe acts 
in ways that would inconvenience executive departments, despite statutory 
language suggesting the propriety of such an interpretation.113  It is not im-
mediately apparent whether this concern stemmed from a desire to facilitate 
executive governance or from a recognition that an interpretation encumber-
ing governance was less likely to have been the congressional intent.  That 
is, did Attorneys General disfavor interpretations encumbering governance 
out of solicitude for effective administration or for the legislative preroga-
tive? 
The answer is far from clear.  Attorneys General strove hard to main-
tain congressional prerogatives and generally imputed unimpeachable mo-
tives to Congress.  Indeed, during the antebellum period some Attorneys 
General had already begun to develop an embryonic form of the constitu-
tional avoidance canon.  In these cases, the “spirit of the laws” seems to 
have included respect for constitutional principles.  For instance in address-
ing the appointment of customs inspectors, Hugh Legare (otherwise some-
thing of a plain meaning advocate), concluded that, because Congress had 
no constitutional authority to vest such appointment powers in collectors, 
the law in question “must not be interpreted to mean that, if it can be inter-
preted to mean anything else.”114  John Crittenden adopted similar reason-
ing, inferring that a disputed bill did not suspend the writ of habeas corpus 
because: 
By the constitution [sic], Congress is expressly forbidden to suspend the privilege 
of this writ “unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may re-
quire it;” and, therefore, such suspension by this act (there being neither rebellion 
nor invasion) would be a plain and palpable violation of the constitution, and no in-
  
 110. Commissioners of the Bank of the United States, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 19, 23 
(1791). 
 111. Case of Sailing Master John Rush, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 372, 377 (1854). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See, e.g., Contract for Embankment at the Navy-Yard at Memphis, 5 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 89, 89 (1849); Enlistment of Minors in the Army, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 607, 614-15 (1854). 
 114. Appointment and Removal of Inspectors of Customs, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 162, 164 
(1843). 
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tention to commit such a violation of their constitution, of their duty and their 
oaths, ought to be imputed to them upon mere constructions and implications.115 
Writing in 1855, Caleb Cushing echoed his predecessors’ arguments.  In a 
lengthy opinion about the appointment power, Cushing interpreted the word 
“shall” to mean “may,” so as to avoid reading a law to suggest that Con-
gress could compel the President to make appointments on a certain day, 
which, according to Cushing, would be beyond Congress’ constitutional 
authority.  Cushing warned, “[W]e are not by construction to assume that a 
legislative act intends any unconstitutional thing when its words can be so 
construed as to mean a constitutional thing.”116  Admittedly, this early itera-
tion of the constitutional avoidance canon appears only rarely in Attorney 
Generals’ opinions before 1860.  However, it is significant that this research 
did not unearth a single opinion determining a congressional statute to be 
unconstitutional.  Attorneys General seem either to have trusted Congress to 
act within its constitutional boundaries, doubted their own authority to dec-
lare a statute unconstitutional, or viewed it as the Executive’s duty to im-
plement statutes in a constitutional fashion, whatever Congress intended. 
Yet, opinions privileging purpose or spirit over text should not be over 
read.  Inquiries into intent or purpose often took a backseat to textual ana-
lyses.  The value accorded to textualism varied, but some Attorneys General 
clearly favored a textualist approach.  John Macpherson Berrien, for in-
stance, presumed that Congress intended only what it expressed.117  Thus, 
Berrien refused to exceed the plausible limits of express statutory terms.118  
Berrien was “aware of the doctrine that statutes ought not to be construed 
according to the letter, but according to the intent of the framers,” but he 
nonetheless believed that legislative intent should not be followed where it 
rendered plain text inoperative.119  Hugh Legare was of like disposition.  
Feeling compelled by statutory language to conclude that mileage reim-
bursements were to be given even for naval voyages abroad, Legare wrote: 
“The legislature meant, no doubt, more than it has said . . . .  But quod vo-
luit, sed non dixit.”120 
  
 115. Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Bill, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 254, 257 (1850); 
see also Pardoning Power of the President, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 579, 587 (1852) (“No such 
unconstitutional intention ought, by mere construction, to be imputed to Congress, or to its 
acts.”). 
 116. Ambassadors and other Public Ministers, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 186, 217 (1855); see 
also Hot Springs of Arkansas, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 697, 700 (1854). 
 117. See, e.g., Additional Rations to Subalterns, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 213, 214 (1829). 
 118. See, e.g., Interest on Commutations, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 390, 391 (1830). 
 119. The Cherokee Lands—Settlers, &c., 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 305, 308-09 (1829). 
 120. Mileage of Navy Officers, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 95, 96 (1842); see also Accounts 
and Accounting Officers, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 106, 106-07 (1842) (counseling a literal reading 
even where it would cause inconvenience). 
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Even for avowed purposivists the first appeal usually was to the lan-
guage of the statute.  For example, William Wirt wrote: “[O]nly where the 
words of the statute are doubtful and uncertain that recourse can be safely or 
properly had to the intention of the legislature to expound the words.”121  In 
an opinion examining the propriety and timing of promotions within the 
Quartermaster’s Department, Caleb Cushing echoed Wirt.  He considered 
the general purpose of Congress only after finding the relevant statutory 
language “utterly unintelligible,”122 a position prefiguring the modern plain 
meaning rule, famously articulated in Caminetti v. United States: 
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought 
in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function 
of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.  
Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of 
interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need 
no discussion.123 
Although the tension between the two methodologies was very real, the line 
between textualism and purposivism often was blurred, and mid-match jer-
sey switching was not uncommon.  “Legislative intent,” after all, can be 
extrapolated from the language of a statute by imagining a particular form 
of legislative draftsman.  Some early Attorneys General exhibited a proto-
populist reliance on the common meaning of words as indicative of intent.  
Isaac Toucey laid down the rule that “the meaning of language in common 
use . . . is always the most sure guide to the true legislative intent.”124  For 
Toucey, legislators were ordinary language speakers. 
But then, as now, where the words appeared mattered.  John Mason 
explained: “The intention of the legislature is a fit and proper subject of 
inquiry, and when ascertained, must control the construction. That intention 
must be collected from the act itself, and other acts in pari materia.”125  For 
some, extra statutory sources were suspect.  Jeremiah Black was forceful in 
his position: 
Congress addresses the executive and judicial departments of the Government only 
through the statute book.  When we speak of the intent of the legislature we refer to 
the meaning of the words used in their act, and not to the unexpressed thought 
which may have been in the minds of the members.  When one or all the members 
of a legislative body declare it to have been their intention that a particular act shall 
  
 121. Fees of Imprisoned Witnesses, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 424, 433 (1820). 
 122. Promotions in the Quartermaster’s Department, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 108, 111 
(1855). 
 123. 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
 124. Pensions of Widows, &c., of Officers and Marines, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 24, 26 
(1848). 
 125. Payment of Florida Bonds, Under Resolution of 1845, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 372, 373 
(1845). 
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have a certain construction, such declaration is useless if their construction be cor-
rect, and unwarranted if it be wrong.126 
Other Attorneys General were somewhat more circumspect.  William Wirt 
disapproved of relying on congressional reports for legislative acts “of a 
general and public nature,” but permitted it “with respect to a private act 
(which is, in truth, rather of the nature of a contract of indemnity than an act 
of legislation).”127  Referring to the use of committee reports, Reverdy John-
son wrote: 
When the words of a statute are doubtful, it is legitimate to refer to such sources of 
information.  But when it is otherwise—when there is no ambiguity, as I think is 
the case within this statute, there is no warrant for qualifying them by reports, or 
speeches, or votes, which may have preceded its passage.128 
Caleb Cushing agreed: “[I]f there be room for reasonable doubt as to the 
legal import of the words, we may recur to the history of a statute, among 
other things, to resolve the doubt.”129 
Cushing was one of the few antebellum Attorneys General to inquire 
into legislative history with any regularity, but he always did so apologeti-
cally.130  It was his stated position that “a report of a committee . . . is not 
itself the law, nor an authoritative exposition of the law.”131  In another opi-
nion, Cushing rejected an argument—premised on the conclusiveness of a 
senator’s comments as reported in the Congressional Globe—by quoting 
with approval Aldridge v. Williams, in which the Supreme Court cautioned: 
The judgment of the court cannot, in any degree, be influenced by the construction 
placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place 
on its passage, nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or 
opposing amendments that were offered.  The law as it passed is the will of the ma-
jority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act 
itself; and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing 
  
 126. Claim of the State of Maryland, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 58-59 (1857).  See also 
Pay of Brevet Rank, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 114, 117 (1857) (“A mere conjecture of the unex-
pressed thought, which may have been in the minds of the members, is a kind of material 
entirely too unsubstantial to make laws of.”); Accounts of the Public Printers, 9 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 437, 438 (1860) (“[T]he intent of a law is not to be learned by ascertaining the thought 
that may have been in the minds of those who passed it, unless the same thought is expressed 
in the law itself.”). 
 127. Claim of the Representative of Henry Willis, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 752, 753 (1823). 
 128. The Grant of Land on Des Moines River to Iowa, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 240, 242 
(1850). 
 129. Case of L.B. Hardin, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 80, 82 (1853). 
 130. See, e.g., The Navy Efficiency Act, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 223 (1856); and Compen-
sation of Collectors of Customs, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 46 (1856). 
 131. Resolutions of Congress, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 680, 687 (1854). 
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it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject, and looking, if 
necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.132 
In short, opinions privileging legislative history were unusual.  They tended 
to be of later origin and typically were prefaced by “don’t try this at home” 
disclaimers. 
This reluctance to credit legislative intent may have been a dogmatic 
point for some early Attorneys General, but it also was surely a pragmatic 
response to the difficulties of ascertaining legislative history in the early 
nineteenth century.  Indeed, there is some evidence that Attorneys General 
occasionally inquired into legislative history but were frustrated in their 
efforts.133  The United States Constitution requires that “[e]ach House shall 
keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, 
excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy.”134  But 
Congress was slow in publishing reliable accounts of its business.  It was 
not until 1851 that the Congressional Globe made widely available some-
thing approaching verbatim transcription of floor debates.135  Committee 
reports were only marginally more accessible.  The American State Papers, 
containing the legislative and executive documents of Congress during the 
period 1789 to 1838, only began publication in 1831.  The United States 
Congressional Serial Set, which continues to provide congressional commit-
tee reports, first became available only in 1817.  This may explain why later 
Attorneys General, such as Caleb Cushing, referred to legislative history 
more often than their predecessors. 
  
 132. Clerks in the State Department, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 464, 465 (1854) (quoting Al-
dridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1844)). 
 133. See, e.g., Contracts and Purchases for the Navy, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 257, 258 
(1829) (complaining that the legislative history of an 1809 statute is deficient and meager). 
 134. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 3. 
 135. Transcripts of floor debates were difficult to come by until 1851. The Annals of 
Congress—formally known as the Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United 
States—covers the 1st Congress through the first session of the 18th Congress, from 1789 to 
1824.  However, the Annals were not published contemporaneously.  Instead, they were 
retrospectively compiled between 1834 and 1856, using the best records available (usually 
newspapers, journals, and stenographic reports); speeches are, therefore, paraphrased rather 
than presented verbatim.  Beginning where the Annals concludes, the Register of Debates 
provides a record of congressional debates from the second session of the 18th Congress to 
the first session of the 25th Congress, spanning 1824 to 1837.  Although published contem-
poraneously, the Register of Debates was not comprehensive, providing only a summary of 
the leading debates of the period.  Succeeding the Register of Debates (and overlapping with 
it for several sessions of Congress), the Congressional Globe contains the congressional 
debates of the 23rd through 42nd Congresses, 1833 to 1873.  Initially, the Globe contained 
only an abstract of the debates and proceedings of Congress.  Only with the 32nd Congress, 
in 1851, did the Globe begin to publish verbatim transcriptions. 
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B. The Use of Background Norms  
Avoidance of interpretations that lead to unconstitutional results is al-
so obviously the use of a higher law norm as the basis for constraining a 
troublesome statutory provision.  Other background norms served similar 
purposes.  William Wirt often self-consciously announced an intention to 
read a statute either narrowly or broadly, depending on background or con-
stitutional variables that he deemed relevant.  For example, he counseled 
reading a statute benefiting wounded veterans broadly: “The manifest object 
of the act is to compensate and reward [veterans], and this object ought not 
to be defeated by construction; the language which would go to defeat it, 
ought to be imperative and clear beyond all doubt.”136  In another opinion, 
Wirt concluded that a statute on courts martial should be construed narrow-
ly, thereby preserving West Point cadets’ rights to civilian trials.  In modern 
parlance, Wirt seemed to recognize a presumption that benefits statutes 
should be construed broadly, while penal statutes demand a narrower ap-
proach. 
Pension statutes seemed to have evoked particularly generous interpre-
tive practices.  Caleb Cushing wrote: 
Some statutes . . . are to be construed liberally; and certainly none more deserve 
such construction, than such as allow to the families of those who gave up their 
lives to the defence [sic] of their country, the same bounty as to their companions 
in arms, who, more fortunate than they, outlived the perils and exposure of the 
war.137 
In a different context, Cushing also explained: 
It is not to be assumed that a general act for the advancement of learning or for the 
relief of the poor, or for preventing the engendering, introduction, or spreading of 
contagious and infectious diseases, shall be so construed and expounded that a by-
path should be left open, through which to evade the necessary and profitable re-
medy, leaving the great and dangerous mischief unsuppressed.138 
John Berrien advised that a statute providing pensions to widows and child-
ren of soldiers who died during the War of 1812 should be read broadly, 
applying also to soldiers who died after the war of wounds inflicted during 
it.139  John Mason agreed.140  Indeed, any statute recognizing and rewarding 
  
 136. General Harrison’s Claim for Services on the Wabash, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 22, 24 
(1826). 
 137. Virginia Bounty Land Warrants, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 243, 264 (1854). 
 138. Passenger Laws—Pardoning Power, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 393, 400 (1854). 
 139. Pensions to Widows and Children of Officers, Seamen, and Marines, 2 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 371, 372 (1830). 
 140. Proof Requisite to Pensions to Widows Under Act of 1846, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 
496, 497 (1846). 
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service to the country tended to receive a liberal construction.141  But back-
ground or context is not self-defining.  Statutes providing monetary benefits 
also appropriate public funds.  Jeremiah Black stated:  
[A]ll laws which give away the public money are to be interpreted strictly against 
the party to whom it is given.  He who claims a payment out of the Treasury, and 
bases that claim upon an act of Congress, must show the payment to be authorized 
either expressly or by very clear implication.142 
Presumably the background norm of congressional control over appropria-
tions might sometimes trump the norm of liberally construing statutes de-
signed to honor claims against the government. 
“Justice,” by contrast, was always to be preferred.  Benjamin Butler 
opined: “It is a first principle in the interpretation of statutes, that, where the 
words are doubtful, such a construction is to be preferred as will be most 
consistent with the reason and justice of the case.”143  Yet not every statute 
permitted the Attorney General the luxury of pursuing what he believed to 
be the just outcome.  In construing a pension law, Butler also wrote: “I was 
desirous to sustain, so far as I could, the liberal interpretation of the acts.”144  
But he could not reconcile such an interpretation with his notion of what 
Congress intended, and consequently was forced to read the statute narrow-
ly.145  Hugh Legare, despite doubting Butler’s earlier interpretation, came to 
a similar conclusion: “I should have rejoiced to be able to adopt a construc-
tion favorable to the claims of the widows of these brave men.  But the law 
which gives, disposes; and I am bound to interpret it as I find it.”146  Writing 
in reference to a reimbursement claim submitted by an army officer, Rever-
dy Johnson lamented: 
The meritorious character of the demand entitles it to all the favor the Executive 
can give, and my examination has been made with a desire to have it allowed, if 
any fair interpretation of the authority of the Executive would justify it; but I can 
find no such authority.147 
  
 141. See e.g., Compensation of Commander of Exploring Expedition, 5 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 591, 600 (1852); Bounties on Re-enlistment, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 187, 191 (1853). 
 142. Claim to the State of Maryland, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59 (1857). 
 143. Pensions—Construction of Act of May 15, 1820, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 58, 64-65 
(1836). 
 144. Pensions to Widows and Orphans of Navy Officers, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 338, 339-
40 (1838). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Pensions to Widows of Officers Under the Act of 1838, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 46, 47 
(1842). 
 147. The Claim of J.M. Cresey, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 102, 102-03 (1849). 
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Further examples could be multiplied.148  No matter how their heartstrings 
pulled at them, antebellum Attorneys General did not confuse reading cer-
tain kinds of statutes liberally with not reading them faithfully. 
C. Interpretive Canons and Rules of Thumb 
Early Attorneys General subscribed to some interpretive “canons of 
construction” with rare exception.  They were unanimous, for example, in 
articulating the rule that statutory repeals by implication were disfavored.149  
Of course, when two statutes unavoidably contradicted each other, the latter 
controlled the former.150  Another canon clearly discernible within early 
opinions is expressio unius est exclusio alterius.151  Here, too, the implica-
tion is that Congress meant exactly and only what it said.  By embracing 
this canon, Attorneys General exhibited a proclivity for reading statutes 
narrowly rather than expansively. 
But, as Karl Llewelyn taught us, canons favoring narrow construction 
confront counter-canons favoring broad or flexible interpretation.  When a 
statute was facially ambiguous, Attorneys General sometimes employed a 
canon approximating the “mischief rule” to explicate the intention of Con-
gress.  This inquiry required a sort of imaginative reconstruction, in which 
the Attorney General placed himself in the position of the enacting legisla-
ture and analyzed both the state of the common law prior to the relevant 
  
 148. See, e.g., Grant of Land to Illinois, Mississippi, &c., 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 603, 608-
09 (1852); Michigan University Lands, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 725, 731 (1854). 
 149. See, e.g., Appointment of Markers of Imported Goods, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 331, 
334 (1838) (“It is against all sound rules of interpretation to consider a statute repealed by 
implication, except when the implication is unavoidable.”); Duties Under the Compromise 
Act of 1833, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 63, 66-67 (1842) (“No principles of interpretation are better 
established than the following: 1st.  That the law does not favor repeal by implication, and 
that it is not to be allowed, unless the repugnancy be quite plain and irreconcilable.”); Term 
and Compensation of New Cherokee Commissioners, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 577, 579 (1847) (“A 
repeal by implication can only be sustained when the subsequent law is repugnant to the 
former.”); Transportation of Foreign Mails, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 543, 545 (1852) (“A second 
law on the same subject does not repeal the former, unless so contrary and so repugnant that 
they cannot stand together.”); Principal Clerks of the General Land Office, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 
42, 45 (1853) (“A subsequent statute, in which there is no repealing clause, shall not, by 
implication, work a repeal of a previous statute, further than the later statute is indisputably 
contradictory to the former ‘in the very matter,’ so that the two cannot be reconciled.”). 
 150. See, e.g., Contract with Grandison Spratt for Hemp, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 40 (1853) 
(accepting repeal by implication when two statutes were clearly irreconcilably repugnant to 
each other); Payment of Certain Moneys to the Creeks, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 46, 48 (1848). 
 151. See, e.g., Transfer of Specific Appropriations of House of Representatives to 
Contingent Fund, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 442, 444 (1839); Power of Secretary of Treasury Res-
pecting Certain Florida Claims, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 286, 291 (1843); Postmasters—How to be 
Compensated Under Act of 1845, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 391, 397 (1845). 
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statute and the defect the statute sought to correct.152  Perhaps because this 
approach is the one that most nearly substitutes judicial for legislative law-
making, it appears only rarely during the period under examination. 
Invocation of the “Whole Act Rule” was much more common.  In in-
terpreting a statute prohibiting contracts between the Executive Branch and 
members of Congress, for instance, William Wirt focused on the structure 
of the relevant statute taken as a whole.  He reasoned that a statute contain-
ing a set of exceptions should be construed more broadly than it otherwise 
might have been.  Specifically, he reasoned, “The exception proves that 
Congress intended, by the first section, to use language broad enough to 
cover the excepted cases; and that hence it was necessary to introduce the 
positive exception.”153  John Crittenden expounded this interpretive rule in 
no uncertain terms: “[I]n the construction of one part of a statute, every oth-
er part ought to be taken into consideration.”154  And Cushing later wrote 
that “[i]n expounding a law, construction is to be made of all the parts to-
gether . . . .  For we may often find out the sense of one clause by the words 
or intent of another clause.”155  
John Berrien deployed this interpretive approach in a rather extreme 
form.  In an opinion expounding the Judiciary Act of 1789, he argued that 
the President’s power to appoint marshals did not extend to newly created 
judicial districts.  Although the twenty-fourth section of the 1789 Act con-
ferred power to appoint marshals, it was to be read in conjunction with the 
second section of the same Act, which divided the United States into only 
thirteen judicial districts.156  If Congress wanted post-1789 judicial districts 
to have marshals appointed by the President, it would have to say so. 
A related rule counseled reading like acts together.  There was a gen-
eral recognition among Attorneys General that a statute should be “read 
with all the other statutes in pari materiâ, as part of a consistent and syste-
matic whole.”157  That is, although issued at different times by different 
Congresses, related laws should be regarded “as constituting one statute.”158  
In an early iteration of this rule, Benjamin Butler explained that the children 
of widows pensioned under an 1836 act were entitled to the balance of the 
pension following the widow’s death.  Butler deduced as much from read-
  
 152. See, e.g., Compensation of Commander of Exploring Expeditions, 5 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 591, 600 (1852); Passenger Laws—Pardoning Power, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 393, 400 
(1854). 
 153. Contracts with Members of Congress, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 38, 39-40 (1826). 
 154. Commissions on Moneys Collected by Postmasters, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 300, 301 
(1851). 
 155. Bounties on Re-enlistment, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 187, 190 (1853). 
 156. Appointment of Marshal for Northern District of Alabama, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 253 
(1829). 
 157. Duties Under the Compromise Act of 1833, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 56, 57 (1842). 
 158. Claims for Supplies Furnished the Florida Militia, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 352 (1845). 
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ing an 1832 act and reasoning “from the connexion [sic] between the two 
laws, and the close analogy which exists between the two classes of cases, I 
think the principle of the former law in this respect may well be regarded as 
pervading the last.”159  Felix Grundy later laid down the rule more concrete-
ly: “[a]ll statutes made on the same subject shall be taken into view, and 
construed together, when the object is to ascertain the true meaning of the 
legislature relative to the subject matter of such statutes.”160 
Further examples abound, spanning the entirety of the period under 
review.161  The underlying basis for this rule was often left inarticulate.  Per-
haps Attorneys General viewed Congress as a univocal institution tran-
scending time.  Or perhaps they viewed statutory law organically.  As in the 
construction of the common law, new statutes were to be interpreted in 
ways that made their meaning consistent with the practices of the past. 
D. The Value of Precedent 
The in pari materia rule was, however, sometimes based explicitly on 
administrative precedent.  John Mason observed: “[I]t is a settled rule of 
construction, that when terms are employed in a statute which had been 
used in former laws, and have received an interpretation, the same interpre-
tation must be given to them in the new law.”162  Indeed, reliance on past 
precedent may have been the only interpretive rule about which every At-
torney General under consideration appears to have been equally dogmatic.  
This rule played out in two distinct, but interrelated, ways.  First, Attorneys 
General were reluctant to depart from the opinions of their predecessors; 
here, respect for past precedent was most similar to the use of stare decisis 
in judicial proceedings.  Second, Attorneys General were hesitant to disturb 
settled practices within line agencies. 
Until the tenure of William Wirt, the opinions of early Attorneys Gen-
eral were not routinely preserved.  Even afterwards, they were not always 
readily accessible to the public.  Thus, Attorneys General might find them-
  
 159. Payment of Balance of Pensions Due Widows at Death, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 151 
(1836). 
 160. Right of Heirs of T.F. Reddick to a Patent for Lands, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 398, 401 
(1839). 
 161. See, e.g., Pension Funds, Books, &c., at the Bank of the U.S., 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 
593, 603 (1834); Accounts of Defaulters and Accounting Officers, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 33, 33 
(1842); Power of Secretary of Treasury Respecting Certain Florida Claims, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 
286, 288 (1843); Postmasters—How to be Compensated Under the Act of 1845, 4 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 391, 396 (1845); Bounties on Re-enlistment, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 187, 190 (1853); Pur-
chase of Public Lands by Aliens, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 351, 352 (1855); Clerk of Courts in the 
District of Columbia, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 33, 37 (1856). 
 162. The Staff of the Marine Corps not Removed from the Line, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 
421, 425 (1845). 
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selves confronted with legal questions already resolved by their predeces-
sors, but unknown to the administrators seeking guidance.  Responding to a 
jurisdictional query previously addressed by several earlier Attorneys Gen-
eral, John Crittenden observed: “That these opinions of the Attorneys Gen-
eral have not had their due effect, may be attributed to the fact, that they 
were not generally known; for, when printed, they were in volumes without 
a proper table of contents until very recently.”163  Nonetheless, Attorneys 
General sought to demonstrate respect for their predecessors by adhering to 
their statutory interpretations.  Indeed, the standard for departing from the 
opinion of an earlier Attorney General was quite high.  Caleb Cushing 
wrote: 
I should, as a matter of course, acquiesce in the direction thus given to the subject 
by two of my predecessors, unless I were fully satisfied that they erred as to the en-
tire . . . [meaning of the law], or some decisive change of facts should now be 
made to appear.164 
On occasion, Attorneys General were even willing to withdraw their own 
opinions, already transmitted, on discovering that a predecessor had advised 
an opposing position upon which agencies had subsequently relied.  Refer-
ring to one such opinion authored by John Berrien, Benjamin Butler wrote: 
The above quoted opinion, not being noted in the index of the record-book kept in 
the office, was unknown to me when my former opinion was prepared.  Had I then 
been acquainted with it, and with the fact (now communicated to me) of its having 
been adopted by the Secretary and Commissioner as the basis of instructions to the 
land officers, I should have deemed it unnecessary and improper to enter into a 
discussion of the points settled by it, and, in accordance with the usual course of 
the office, would have adopted and applied, so far as it extended, the decision of 
Mr. Berrien; and although not yet convinced that my own construction of the sta-
tute is erroneous, I think this is a proper case for advising your department to ad-
here to his exposition rather than to mine.165 
Withdrawal, in such instances, was typically prompted both by respect and 
by a desire to further “consistency of administration and the rights of par-
ties.”166  Repeatedly, Attorneys General appeared extremely reluctant to 
disturb administrative practice founded on the opinions of their predeces-
sors.167  John Crittenden explained this phenomenon as an extension of the 
doctrine of stare decisis, acknowledging: 
It is true that this is a doctrine which belongs more particularly to the courts of law; 
but in its reasons and principles it has some application to all official public trans-
  
 163. Jurisdiction of the Accounting Officers, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 630, 638-39 (1852). 
 164. Prize Agents, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 197, 198 (1853). 
 165. Pre-emptions, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 182, 186 (1837). 
 166. Pensions to Widows, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 68, 69 (1836) (withdrawing an opinion 
after learning that an earlier opinion of William Wirt dealt with the subject differently). 
 167. See, e.g., Sales of Creek Reservations by Administrators, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 75, 
76 (1842). 
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actions, and tends to give stability, uniformity, and certainty to the administration 
of law by the executive department of government.168 
However, as Caleb Cushing’s previously-mentioned opinion169 suggests, 
respect was not confused with abdication.  Elsewhere, Cushing declared: 
“If, on consideration of the whole subject, my duty should appear to require 
me to overrule a past decision, of course it would be done, even at the risk . 
. . of incurring the imputation of presumptuous disregard of a long line of 
concordant decisions and authorities.”170  Such departures can sometimes be 
explained on the basis of conflicting methodological commitments.171 
Respect for precedent also manifested itself in the deference Attorneys 
General showed for the settled practices and interpretations of line agencies.  
As early as 1807, Caesar Rodney wrote: 
I am sensible that the usage of any particular department does not create or consti-
tute the law, and I am aware of the jealousy manifested by the federal courts on 
this particular topic.  Yet, in ascertaining the just and reasonable construction of a 
law not unequivocally plain, the course of a department acting under the law from 
its first existence, or other departments acting under laws precisely similar, is en-
titled to respect and consideration.172 
Subsequent Attorneys General evidently concurred.  As Caleb Cushing rec-
ognized: “[A]dministrative practice does not constitute final construction of 
a statute.”173  Nonetheless it was persuasive and often was a key determinant 
within Attorney General opinions. 
Two reasons for this deference can be inferred.  First, there seems to 
have been a belief that Congress would have corrected erroneous agency 
practices if provided with an opportunity to do so.  John Crittenden wrote: 
[W]here Congress may be presumed to know the practice or usage that has been 
pursued in construing, and carrying into effect one of their enactments, and passes, 
without objection to that usage in another similar act, they must be understood as 
expecting and intending that it shall be carried into effect according to the same 
practical construction.174  
  
 168. Power of the Secretary of the Treasury Respecting Certain Florida Land Claims, 
5 Op. Att’y Gen. 333, 351-52 (1851). 
 169. Prize Agents, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 197, 198 (1853). 
 170. Claims Under the Florida Treaty, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 533, 543 (1854). 
 171. See, e.g., Interest on Communications, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 390, 391-92 (1830) 
(relying on the plain text of a statute in refuting the purposivist interpretation of a previous, 
and unnamed, AG); Concerning Patents for Creek Reserve Lands, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 644, 646 
(1841) (overturning Felix Grundy’s purposivist construction of an act based in part upon “the 
language of the act itself”). 
 172. House Rent of Commanding Officer at Navy Yard, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 160, 161 
(1807). 
 173. Military Officers’ Lost Horses, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 293, 296 (1857). 
 174. Usages of the Departments, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 562, 563-64 (1852). 
Spring] Administrative Statutory Interpretation 47 
 
Thus, for instance, language used in an 1850 act, having received a particu-
lar interpretation by the Navy Department, was construed by Cushing as 
having the same meaning in an 1853 act, under the assumption that “the 
repetition of the words constitutes a legislative adoption and sanction of that 
construction of the Department.”175  Indeed, congressional inaction was 
sometimes taken to signal implicit approval of an agency’s statutory inter-
pretation.  This was particularly true when more than one Congress had 
enjoyed a chance to review a given agency practice.  John Berrien advised: 
[W]here . . . a question has been deliberately settled, and the practice of your de-
partment, under the eye of government, during successive sessions of Congress, 
has conformed to the decision then made, it does not seem to me to be proper to 
disturb it, unless a very strong and pressing case should be presented to your con-
sideration.176 
Deference to their predecessors’ opinions was also to some considerable 
degree based on the value of deference to settled administrative practice.  
John Mason explained: “Where a practical construction of laws has been 
given and acted on for a long time at one of the departments, it is entitled to 
great respect, and should not be lightly disturbed.”177 Mason later continued: 
[A]fter a continuous series of uniform decisions on a point, in numerous cases, and 
for many years, under successive administrations of the subject-matter, it seems to 
be hardly worth while to recur to doubts of mere statute construction, not involving 
any question of constitutionality, or of grave public or private wrong.178 
Unlike modern doctrines of judicial deference to agency interpretations, this 
brand of deference does not appear to have been grounded in principles of 
comity and interdepartmental respect, or on some particular capacity or ex-
pertise of administrative agencies.  Certainly, administrative agencies were 
recognized by Attorneys General to be uniquely suited to interpreting their 
own rules and instructions,179 but this expertise was not perceived to extend 
to legislation.  Because Attorneys General consistently referred in their de-
ferential opinions to long-settled agency practices,180 newer interpretations 
of congressional statutes by agencies would, by implication, not have been 
  
 175. Extra Pay on Pacific Naval Service, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 299, 303 (1855). 
 176. Pay and Emoluments of Paymaster, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 220, 223 (1829). 
 177. Compensation of Receiver of Public Moneys at Kalamazoo, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 
467, 470 (1846). 
 178. Arrearages of Pensions, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 717, 720 (1856). 
 179. See, e.g., Surveys of Public Lands, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 281, 283 (1837) (finding 
the Treasury Department to be “perfectly competent, and best qualified, to construe its own 
instructions”). 
 180. See, e.g., Rations of Navy Commissioners, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 557, 558 (1833) 
(“Whenever an act of Congress has, by actual decision, or by continued usage and practice, 
received a construction at the proper department, and that construction has been acted on for 
a succession of years, it must be a strong and palpable case of error and injustice that would 
justify a change in the interpretation given to it.”). 
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entitled to the same respect.  Attorneys General deferred to settled agency 
practice—not because it was agency practice—but because it was settled, 
and thus approached a law-like status.  John Crittenden explained: 
A continued and uniform practice . . . is evidence of the contemporaneous and 
practical construction of the law, and is entitled to great respect.  Adherence to es-
tablished rules prevents the arbitrary action of the executive branches of the gov-
ernment, and produces certainty and equality, at least, in their administrations. . . .  
Indeed, the practice or usage of the Executive Departments may, and not infre-
quently does, acquire an implied sanction from Congress, that gives it to some ex-
tent the force and authority of law itself.181 
Lawful governance requires consistency and predictability, values the At-
torneys General—like the line agencies—sought to promote.  These values 
helped regulated parties understand their rights and responsibilities, while 
also preserving agencies’ ability to develop reliable departmental proce-
dures and stable operations.  In that sense, they were absolutely crucial to 
the rule of law in a government not yet recognized as an “administrative 
state,” but in which administration of the laws was, perhaps even more than 
today, dependent upon administrative interpretation—both by line adminis-
trators and the Attorneys General who sometimes advised them. 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial construction of federal statutes was rare in antebellum Ameri-
ca and appellate-style judicial review of administrative interpretation was 
virtually non-existent.  Federal statutes meant what administrators—line 
agencies, Attorneys General, and sometimes Presidents—said they meant.  
In their quasi-judicial, opinion-writing functions, Attorneys General re-
vealed preoccupations with interpretive rules and methods that preview later 
judicial opinions and raise timeless interpretive issues that resonate with 
modern interpretive debates.  They could not settle anymore than we can on 
general interpretive principles that applied across all cases and all statutes. 
If there is one principle that stands out in their opinions, it is perhaps 
the value of consistency and uniformity.  Although there was no intellectual 
category called “administrative law,” the opinions of the early Attorneys 
General emphasized an expectation of regularity in administration that is at 
the core of our modern conception of the rule of law in the administrative 
state.  This familiar commitment gave rise to a form of interpretive defe-
rence, but one founded on ideas quite different from those courts now arti-
culate.  They gave deference to their predecessors and to line agency prac-
tices, not because of notions of expertise or of presidential political control, 
but because of values of transparency, reliance, and presumed congressional 
  
 181. Usages of the Departments, 5 Op. Att’y Gen. 562, 563 (1852). 
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acquiescence.  We suspect that a William Wirt, or even a Caleb Cushing,182 
would have been puzzled by arguments for deference based on the need for 
policy flexibility or a change in administrations. 
Then as now, line agencies seem to have been preoccupied with cen-
tralized control and effective implementation.  They did not address meta-
questions of interpretive method.  They applied the law and answered sub-
ordinates’ questions.  Then as now, the rationales for their particular inter-
pretations were often lost, remained inarticulate, or were subsumed in the 
act of policy choice.  Hence, then as now, the interpretive practices of the 
people who most often interpret and apply federal law remain the most mys-
terious—and the most often ignored. 
  
 182. Cushing clearly believed in the necessity for hierarchical oversight, particularly 
his own. See Office and Duties of the Attorney General, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326 (1854).  But 
that did not necessarily imply a power to change settled statutory meaning to conform to the 
politics of a new president. 
